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BAY OF PIGS.   Term Paper ID:20243 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: 1961 U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba. Background, politics, military, reasons for failure, effects.... More...

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Paper Abstract: 1961 U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba. Background, politics, military, reasons for failure, effects. Paper Introduction: The Bay of Pigs This paper will examine the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April of 1961 and some of the sources. Included in this examination will be a discussion of the events leading up to the operation, the role of the U.S. military in the operation, and the effects of the operation and its failure upon all involved parties. Situated ninety miles off the southern coast of Florida, Cuba has always had some sort of economic relationship with the United States. This relationship escalated at the beginning of the 20th Century, after the United States severed Cuba's colonial relationship with Spain in the Spanish American War. Throughout the Century, the United States dominated Cuba's economy and gained tremendous political influence on the island, virtually replacing Spain as Cuba's Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. bombs. One effect of this change was that thesize of the planned guerrilla force was decreased as the size of the strikeforce grew. The main problem with the Report asa source is that a fair amount of it is still classified, especially withregards to the names of some of the operatives involved. Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs. In retrospect, there would have been no invasionif there had been no antagonism between the two superpowers. Although vulnerable to criticism that a report authorized by the sameAdministration which launched the operation is bound to whitewash theevents, the Taylor Report memorandum were surprisingly critical of theactions of the agencies involved. military fired a shot during theoperation. "Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs." Political science Quarterly 99 (1984): 471-91.Wyden, Peter. In addition, the fact that there was some sort ofoperation planned was no longer a secret. The Sea Furys could carry2.75 in. On Tuesday, April 18, the invasion force came under attack from tanksand artillery, as Castro concentrated his forces against the beachhead.Rebel forces were concentrated onto one beach in order to ease the supplyand command problems (Kesaris 25-27). The situation prompted Kennedy to exclaim that Castro did not needagents in the U.S.; he only needed to read U.S. Included in this examination will bea discussion of the events leading up to the operation, the role of theU.S. Paterson's article, while not a fresh account of the eventssurrounding the invasion, was a critical examination of the motivationbehind the decisions. President-elect Kennedy was briefed on the operation on November 28,196 . During the firstmonth of his presidency, Kennedy consulted with his advisors on theprospects of invading Cuba. Indeed, in the middle of the narrative concerning the invasionitself, the authors could not resist inserting several paragraphsexplaining the preparations made by organized crime families to reinsertthemselves into the Cuban resort and entertainment industry (78-79). Vandenbroucke did rely ona wider range of sources than Anderson, including primary sources. Vandenbroucke inserted the operation into four different modelsand evaluated the fit between the example and the models. The stated reason forthis change was that Castro was becoming increasingly effective atcontrolling the civilian population. By the end of the book, the reader is left with theimpression that much of U.S. foreign policy in the early 196 s was made bySam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli. Thus thefirst overt invasion event was the B-26 airstrike at dawn on Saturday,April 15. At the end of Memorandum No. In addition, the initial airstrike byexile aircraft was reduced in scope so as to preserve the charade that allthe aircraft originated from bases in Cuba. This fact could maintain thecover story that the rebel aircraft were being operated from inside Cuba.In order to maintain the "quietness" of the operation, the paratroop dropswould occur at dawn, while the ships would be unloaded before dawn. Paterson, ed. Even in his discussion of the missile crisis, Paterson placed theemphasis on U.S./Cuba relations in explaining the Soviet decision to basemissiles in Cuba. Serious consideration for overthrowing Castro began immediately afterCastro's April 1959 visit to the United States, at the behest of Vice-President Richard Nixon. "Fixation with Cuba: the Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War against Castro." In Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963, Thomas G. This narrative was fairly complete and is valuableas a straightforward source of those events; it probably contained one ofthe most complete accounts of the combat on and over the beachhead itself,at least as told from the point of the exile Cuban Brigade (Kesaris 21-3 ).John Prados' 1986 book, Presidents' Secret Wars, also gave straight forwardaccount, ignoring the salacious bits of organized crime and sex so loved byMessieurs Hinckle and Turner. Castro was nowcertain that the United States planned to militarily invade Cuba.Ultimately, this fear pushed Castro even closer to the Soviet Union andprompted the two countries to challenge the United States through theplacement in Cuba of Soviet ballistic missiles equipped with nuclearwarheads (Beschloss 38 -87). As the aircraft in Nicaragua wereprepared for a second strike to take care of the surviving Cuban aircraft,however, Kennedy cancelled the strike until after the landings secured theairfield on the beach. force and fearedintervention in the Revolution. The allegation that John Kennedy shared a mistresswith certain mafia characters has been voiced in many places and it is notthe purpose of this paper to dispute these allegations. Coincidentally, asuccessful deposition of Castro before November 196 would virtually ensureNixon's victory in the presidential elections that month. In the Soviet Union, Premier NikitaKrushchev saw the failed invasion as an opportunity to take a harder lineagainst the United States. Instead, top level direction was given throughad hoc meetings of senior officials without consideration of writtenoperational plans and with no arrangement for recording the conclusions anddecisions reached (Kesaris 39). Wyden asserted that the most damaging decisions were those dealingwith the air cover for the invasion. 2, an interesting point was made. "Normal Failures in the Foreign Policy Advisory Process." World Affairs 146 (1983): 148-175.Beschloss, Michael R. In fact, several members of the Joint Chiefs of Staffconsidered the CIA plan weak and sloppy, with too much depending upon theexpectation of a popular uprising (Wyden 86-92). The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Krushchev, 196 -1963. Coordinating infantry, tanks, and massive amounts of artillery,the Cubans overran the beachhead by nightfall. Navy A4D pilots, meanwhile, were becoming upset at notbeing able to assist the rebel forces. On Sunday, April16, Kennedy gave the final approval for the landings, scheduled formidnight on April 17 (Kesaris 18). The fleet assembled forthe assault consisted of surplus landing craft from World War II andcommercial freighters, none of which had any anti-aircraft protectionbeyond .5 caliber machine guns. Castro could rely upon theCuban people to support him and his revolution to the extent that he armedmost of the population. As such, Anderson's article is ofprimary interest to political scientists and psychologists; its usefulnessto the historian is limited to a possible explanation of how the decisionto launch the operation was made. Kennedy felt betrayed by the CIA, the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, and the State Department. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. This task force was to escort the invasionships up to a certain point; then, two destroyers, the U.S.S. Such a developmentcould have resulted in the open support of the United States and some LatinAmerican governments (326). New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991.Hinckle, Warren and Turner, William W. Castro,however, understood that Cuba was vulnerable to U.S. One of his first decisions was thatthe United States would not invade Cuba in order to get rid of Castro andthe Communists (Beschloss 146-47). Wyden was able to interview some of the Cuban defenders, although heapparently was not able to get any new information from the man whoeffectively led the Cuban forces, Fidel Castro. Immediately upon taking power, therefore,he avoided anti-American statements and even travelled to the United Statesto address public assemblies; in front of the American Society of NewspaperEditors he promised a free press in Cuba, while telling the Senate ForeignRelations Committee that no American property would be seized (Beschloss95). It was determinedthat the decision-making process which led to the Bay of Pigs did not fitthe first two models very well, which delineated either a rational or abureaucratic decision-making process. Hethought that the Trinidad plan was too politically risky (Wyden 98-1 1). in the wake of the Saturday strike;Kennedy wanted to make sure that any further strikes could be attributed toplanes flying out of Cuban airfields (Kesaris 2 -21). Of course, one ofthe primary reasons for the military failure was the cancellation of thesecond airstrike against the Cuban Air Force by Kennedy; the Committeestated that the planners bear some of the responsibility for thecancellation because they failed to clearly outline the airstrike plan inadvance to the President and the Secretary of State and they failed toexplain to the President with "proper force" the probable militaryconsequences of the last-minute cancellation (Kesaris 38). No member of the U.S. The operation was set to begin on the weekend of April 14-16, 1961. As advisor Arthur Schlesinger stated in amemorandum, while evidence of American sponsorship might be unavailable, itwould be impossible to convince the world that the United States did notsponsor the operation. In his book, Victims of Groupthink, Janis arguedthat the decision to invade was the result of psychological pressures forconsensus and conformity within the group of advisors and decision-makers.Consequently, those involved ignored information which cast doubt on theinvasion's potential for success. Beschloss also stated that Kennedy's principal concern with theinvasion was that if the U.S. If this was not done, then the operation should have beenabandoned (Kesaris 4 ). Frederick: Aletheia Books, 1981.Paterson, Thomas G. After the inauguration, Kennedy authorized an analysis of theCIA plans by the Defense Department and a continuation of other activitiesagainst Cuba, such as propaganda, sabotage, and U-2 overflights (Kesaris9). The Fish is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro. The Essex was to be accompanied by five destroyers, who were to havetheir hull numbers painted over. Military interventionin Cuba was occasionally necessary in order to maintain American control.Until the end of 1958, President Fulgencio Batista was actively supportedby the United States, through the activities of the Central IntelligenceAgency, during the Castro Revolution (Paterson 127-28). 3 concluded that sinceoperations of this sort would be necessary, they should be better plannedfor success. The Skyhawk pilots found no rebel aircraftto escort, however, and were forced to return to the Essex when their fuelran low (Wyden 235-43). Influenced by hisVice-President, Eisenhower approved a $13 million budget in August of 196 for such an operation by the CIA (Wyden 28-3 ). Warren Hinckle's and William Turner's The Fish is Red covered a muchlonger time span than the other sources, concerning itself with the entire"secret war" against Fidel Castro. None of the American forces were allowed to engage in combat,other than for self-defense (Wyden 125-31). One of the advantages of landing atTrinidad was that if the landing forces ran into heavy opposition, theycould move into the mountains and sustain themselves in Cuba as a guerrillaforce. support of it and connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed.Thus, efforts to hide U.S. 3 contained the conclusions of the Cuban Study Group.Chief among these conclusions was that a paramilitary operation of thismagnitude could not be prepared and conducted in such a fashion that allU.S. He did not try to establish the mood in theUnited States at that time, but seemed to assume that the reader would beaware of the anti-communist mood present in the country. Even Wyden pointed out that the mainquestion concerning Castro in the minds of U.S. Insistent that the ties between theCuban exile brigade and the United States be hidden, he ordered that noU.S. Consequently, Kennedy increased hispersonal control over foreign policy. The problem with Vandenbroucke's article, as with Anderson's article,is that it broke no new ground as far as the historical record, but simplyattempted to explain the decision-making process. Wyden argued that had the Cuban Air Force been destroyed by themorning the exiles could at least have established a beachhead upon whichthe exile government could have established a base. forcesbe involved in the invasion, that the landings switch locations, and thatthe initial airstrike be reduced in scope; these decisions guaranteed thefailure of the operation (1 5-1 6). The American pilots andinstructors were all recruited from the vast pool of retired militaryofficers which had existed since the end of World War II; word-of-mouthrecruitment quickly spread rumors of the operation throughout the equallyvast aviation community. One B-26 was lostand the attackers destroyed 5 Cuban aircraft (Kesaris 18), leaving Castrowith at least two T-33s and several Sea Furys (Wyden 193). This action could be a very real possibility, as the landing forcewas not strong enough by itself to fight the Cuban army and militia insustained combat. ByApril of 1961, the imminence of the invasion was an open secret amongstcertain reporters in Washington; as a result, the Administration was forcedto ask the New York Times and the New Republic not to publish scheduledstories. Thisrelationship escalated at the beginning of the 2 th Century, after theUnited States severed Cuba's colonial relationship with Spain in theSpanish American War. Themodels, however, seem little more than common sense; indeed, the thirdmodel does little more than give a pseudo-scientific name to a descriptionof everyday political life. foreign policy between the end of World War II and thedemise of the Soviet Union in 1992. The Bay ofPigs invasion was simply used as an example of a failure in the advisoryprocess. The authors never failed to exclude pertinent informationconcerning the decisions which led to the invasion in favor of luriddetails about the criminal peccadilloes and/or sexual escapades of themajor actors. aircraft to fly over Cuba during the operationwere reconnaissance aircraft and Skyhawks from the Essex, which were notallowed to engage in combat with Cuban forces. personnel be allowed to take active part in the operation (136). The Cold Warinfluenced all U.S. Opposition from militia forces was immediate but the brigadewas able to secure the beachhead fairly quickly. TheCommittee stated that the Executive branch was not organizationallyprepared to cope with this sort of paramilitary operation because there wasno single authority, short of the President, capable of coordinating theactions at the CIA, the State Department, the Department of Defense, andthe U.S. newspapers (Beschloss 1 9). Paterson followed thesetheories through his examination of the three conflicts between the U.S.and Cuba, insisting that Kennedy's policy towards Cuba was of his ownmaking, and not inherited from the Eisenhower Administration. Beschloss asserted that a critical consideration in planning anyoperation against Cuba was how would the Soviets react. On March 11, Bissell formally recommended the Trinidad plan: anamphibious assault protected by tactical air support and the subsequentlanding of a provisional government. Finally, the order wasgiven for the A4Ds to provide fighter escort for the rebel B-26s on themorning of Wednesday, April 19. The major actors in the CIA at that time did not fit the stereotypeof the psychotic assassins which has become so prevalent in the past 25years. The American presence in the operation was limited to CIAorganization, training, American contract pilots, and propaganda broadcastsurging the Guatemalans to revolt (Wyden 2 -21). Wyden portrayed both men as active "go-getters" with a taste for adventure; but fit neither of them into thenegative stereotype mentioned above. Eaton andU.S.S. Essex, to patrol the area close to Cuba during the operation. Thus, the Group recommended the establishment of agovernmental mechanism capable of coordinating all of the agencies involved(Kesaris 43). The Bay of Pigs This paper will examine the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs inApril of 1961 and some of the sources. Kennedy, however, rejected this planas "too spectacular;" he wanted something quieter, without the interventionof the U.S. The rebels, lackingeffective air cover and firepower, could do little to resist the attack,although they refused an American offer of evacuation (Wyden 276-77). Finally, Kennedy cancelled thesecond strike outright, after the negative reaction in the U.N. Although technically not fighters, the nimbleSkyhawks were armed with 2 mm cannon and could outperform either the SeaFurys or T-33s in air-to-air combat (Wyden 125-27). There was anairfield just outside town and mountains just north of town. Throughout the Century, the United States dominatedCuba's economy and gained tremendous political influence on the island,virtually replacing Spain as Cuba's colonial master. Almost from the beginning, the plans resembled those of thesuccessful operation in Guatemala in 1954. Originally planned to be carried out by sixteen aircraft, thestrike force was reduced to six aircraft by Kennedy, who thought thatsixteen aircraft were too many to keep quiet (Wyden 17 ). By the summer of 196 , the Cuban-Sovietrelationship was open and the superpower war of words over Cuba accelerated(Beschloss 96-98). sponsorship in January of 1961 (Wyden 45-53). These Yale intellectuals eitherunderestimated or completely ignored the value of human assets, those Cubanpeasants who were willing to take their weapons down to the beachhead andfight the exiles without direct orders as to what to do (327). Information Agency. The rebel air crews, in the meantime,were exhausted and some were refusing to fly over the beachhead.Consequently, Bissell authorized the American instructor pilots to flycombat missions over the beachhead, where they enjoyed some success againstthe Cuban troops. Kennedyexaggerated the threat from Cuba, including that of exporting communistrevolution to Latin America (129). This decisionultimately allowed the Cuban fighters to destroy many of the rebel B-26sand prevented the rebels from attaining control of the air over thebeachhead (Wyden 195-2 2). military and with the American sponsorship concealed. The first memorandum of the Taylor report consisted of a narrative ofthe the invasion itself. They also said that the worst outcomewould be an unsuccessful invasion, demonstrating weakness to the Soviets(9 -91). For theoperation, however, a squadron of A4D Skyhawk light attack jets wasassigned to the carrier, after modifications to the carrier's catapultsystem were completed. Similarly, Nixon, Eisenhower, and Kennedy were all proponents of theplan, as well as others to assassinate Castro. Eisenhower was briefed on this plan in November of 196 , afterthe elections (Kesaris 5-7). His advisors informed him that the Sovietswould not go to war over Cuba, especially if the invasion was concludedsuccessfully within a short time. The plan now called for a landing of a brigade-size force (13 men)on the southern coast of Cuba, near the town of Trinidad. Navy Skyhawks to the battle, but this wouldhave violated Kennedy's order of no direct U.S. New York: Harper & Row, 1981.Kesaris, Paul L. Both became quite involved with theCuban exiles they trained and supervised and both risked their lives by theend of the invasion to help the floundering operation and the men left onthe beach without the proper support. Few serious readers wouldplace any of these individuals among the cast of history's famouspsychopaths, yet all three approved the plan. participation should have been limited andresponsibility for the amphibious assault transferred from the CIA to thePentagon. The ultimateobject of the assault was to inspire the anti-Castro guerrillas already inCuba to rebel and overthrow Castro. Duringthe actual assault, the brigade would be given close air support by the B-26s. The fact that the Cubans could fly combat sorties at allwas due to the reduced initial airstrike on April 15 and the cancelledfollow-up airstrike. The tinyrebel force crossed into the Honduras and after some sporadic actions,during which a single courier was killed, the officer corps of theGuatemalan Army revolted and installed the rebel leader as the newpresident. openly moved against Cuba with Americanforces, Krushchev would retaliate by moving against Berlin. By the end of the battle, the brigade had lost 114 men killed; 1,189were captured (Wyden 3 3). Six American pilots flew combat sorties for thebrigade; four were killed (Wyden 235-4 ). Such a movewould force the U.S. One of the most important aspects of the entire operation wassecrecy; not only did the fact of American sponsorship have to be hidden,but also the fact that an operation was even being planned. The invasion force, however, had no fighters; the plan was to destroythe Cuban Air force on the ground in the two days prior to the landing.This would be accomplished by the B-26s, operating out of Nicaragua. Wyden was less complimentary aboutsome of the military officers attached to the CIA who managed the operationfrom Washington and were ostensibly responsible for the major decisionsduring the invasion. Anderson examined the theory of Professor Irving Janis that theBay of Pigs was a failure at the decision-making level, that the ultimatedecision was a wrong one. Thismeant that although an aircraft carrier was assigned to escort the invasionfleet its attack squadron was not permitted to take any action againstCuban forces except in sel-defense. In order to establish the ruse that the planes were being flown out ofCuban bases by rebel pilots, one pilot was to fly his B-26 to Miami justprior to the initial airstrike and tell authorities, and the press, that hewas defecting from Cuba. This situation could have beenremedied by committing the U.S. The last model stated that in the governmentaldecision-making process, the participants either strive for a congruence ofbeliefs and perceptions, disregarding information which challenges thesebeliefs, or alleviate stress by ignoring information which conflict withtheir beliefs when they realize the high risks to a policy but see nobetter alternatives (488). Similarly, the two U.S.destroyers which accompanied the brigade to the beach were not allowed toprovide gunfire support. By the Fall of 1959, Castro was secretly negotiating with the Sovietsfor the military and economic support of Cuba, perhaps recognizing that hewas unlikely to receive any serious help from the West and hoping thatSoviet sponsorship would deter the United States from any attempt tooverthrow his government. By this time, the training areas in Guatemalahad already been set up and a large number of anti-Castro Cubans were beingtrained (Wyden 53-64). On March 15, the CIA's paramilitary staff suggested that the bestalternative site was along the eastern Zapata swamps, next to Cochinos Bay(Bay of Pigs) and approximately 1 miles west of Trinidad. Janis called this a "systemic failure" ofthe advisory process (Anderson 165). Memorandum No. The planners, and the Pentagon, were not willing to leave all airsupport to the Cuban rebels, however. Wyden left the reader with nodoubt that Kennedy was fully aware of the planning from the moment he wonthe election. The purposeof this final escort was to make sure that the assault ships made it safelyto the beaches, although by this time the Cuban Air Force should have beendestroyed. Wyden was particularly good at detailing the involvement of theintermediate and low-level participants. Situated ninety miles off the southern coast of Florida, Cuba hasalways had some sort of economic relationship with the United States. Critical to the plan was close air support. 2 of the Taylor report gave the reasons for theimmediate failure of the military part of the operation. Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations since World War II. The lack ofammunition was directly attributable to the lack of effective air cover,since most of the brigade's ammunition was sunk on the first morning byCuban airstrikes. This was theplan which received initial executive approval for a $13 million budget inAugust of 196 (Kesaris 4-5). The reasons for the operation's failure were several. Murray, were to escort the assault force to the beaches. Ascheduled diversionary landing on the night of Friday, April 14 was abortedby the Cuban commander of the diversionary force when he saw a few vehicleson the beach where he was to land (Kesaris 17-18, Wyden 17 -72). military in the operation, and the effects of the operation and itsfailure upon all involved parties. What noone noticed, or cared to point out, was that the brigade troops could nolonger move into the mountains should the landings go poorly; the nearestmountains were more than eighty miles away (Wyden 1 -1 3). The author explained that thedecision-making process which led to the operation was neither rational norentirely confined by a bureaucratic framework (472-8 ). Works CitedAnderson, Paul A. Such an analysis is commonplace in thehistorian's world. Similarly, Wyden did not elaborate on the Cold Warbackground to the operation. Much of the discussionfocused upon the aspects of "groupthink" suggested by Janis and how theydid not fit the Bay of Pigs example. What the planners neglected to consider, and whata couple of reporters eventually noticed, was that the Cuban Air Force B-26s had clear plexiglass noses while the rebel B-26s, such as the one flownto Miami, had opaque metal noses (Wyden 174-76). The animosity between the two governments was justtoo open (Wyden 151). The only U.S. They assigned the aircraft carrier,U.S.S. Whatever the reasons for the operation and its failure, the Bay ofPigs invasion had far-reaching effects in the United States, the SovietUnion, and Cuba. Finally, Memorandum No. Thegreatest impact of the failed invasion was felt in Cuba. On Wednesday morning, the Cuban forces, numbering approximately2 , and personally directed by Castro, mounted a major attack againstthe rebels. Mostof the rebel tanks and machine guns were out of ammunition and the troopsthemselves remained vulnerable to the Cuban air attacks. Kennedy's statements during the campaign indicated that he heldhardline views on Castro and Cuba; he criticized Eisenhower for ignoringwarnings of Castro's Communist leanings and called for American assistanceto Cuban exiles who wished to overthrow Castro (Beschloss 1 1). to either renege on its commitments to NATO orforcefully respond to the Soviet move, and possibly start a nuclear war.This was the ultimate reason for Kennedy's insistence that no U.S. In addition, the Cuban AirForce possessed Lockheed T-33 single-engine jet fighter/trainers, aircraftwhich dated back to the late 194 s (Wyden 2 3). participation. Memorandum No. in responseto the first strike. Both of thesegoals were unreachable. The rebel brigade reached the two beaches at the assigned time andbegan landing. Here, there wasan airstrip which could accommodate the twin-engine B-26 attack bomberswhich were to comprise the main air support. Covered to a lesser extent in Wyden'sbook and some of the other sources, this "secret war" included the numerousplots to assassinate Castro which allegedly involved members of Americanorganized crime. That operation successfullyoverthrew the leftist government in one week, using 15 Guatemalan exilesand a few World War II fighters flown by American contract pilots. Instead,Vandenbroucke asserted that the operation better fit the last two models,the first of which stated that governmental decisions are the result of abargaining between different participants with different values, goals,stakes, and power (48 -81). Unfortunately, Wyden never developed this idea intoa discussion of whether or not this lack of experience contributed to thepoor planning and ultimate failure of the operation. In fact, Kennedy's hand was present throughout the finalplanning stages and Wyden gave a full hearing to the long-standing chargesthat some of Kennedy's decisions contributed to the rapid failure of theinvasion. Thomas Paterson's 1989 article, "Fixation with Cuba," pointed outthat Kennedy probably spent more time on Cuba than on any other foreignpolicy problem during his presidency (123). leaders in 1959 was whetherCastro was a communist. The authors did include a large section on the Bay of Pigsinvasion, but this was compromised by a severe problem which pervaded theentire book. Once the Cuban T-33s and Sea Furys began flying overthe beachhead, the brigade could expect no effective air support since therebels had no fighters (Kesaris 37-38). New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. Similarly, rebel B-26s trying to flyair cover over the beachhead came under frequent attack by T-33s and SeaFurys; many of the rebel planes were either shot down or damaged soseverely that they had to return to Nicaragua (Wyden 228-32). This action was taken after the wide-rangingprotests which had occurred at the U.N. Paterson gave several possiblereasons for this "fixation:" an eagerness for action, a personal rivalrybetween two charismatic leaders, or a feeling of betrayal on the part ofKennedy, who had initially welcomed the Cuban Revolution before Castroopenly cast his lot with the communists (124-25). The reason for this may be that becausethe operation was a failure, there was much to be learned from it; thewhole point of the establishment of the Committee was to prevent such adisaster from occurring in the future. air-to-ground rockets and the B-26 aircraft could carry several25 and 5 lb. The two mostimmediate causes were a lack of ammunition and firepower on the ground anda lack of effective air cover and support. After a three-and-one-half hours meeting withCastro during that visit, Nixon was convinced that Castro was either aCommunist or under the influence of Communists. "Normal Failures in the Foreign Policy Advisory Process," by PaulAnderson, dealt with decision-making failures in foreign policy. By the Fall of 196 , however, the planchanged to that of a Cuban exile strike force landing on the coast tosupplement the guerrilla forces of the initial plan. Lucien Vandenbroucke's 1984 article, "Anatomy of a Failure: theDecision to land at the Bay of Pigs," took an approach similar to that ofAnderson. Anderson disputed this assessment and said that the failure of theoperation was a "normal failure." Anderson used Wyden's book to point outthat there was critical discussion of the plans at advisory meetings andthat the ultimate decision to invade was made by President Kennedy after aconsiderable amount of careful thought (165). Many scholars have argued that the decision to invade Cuba was itselfwrong. The reader learns much about thetwo CIA agents responsible for supervising the actual invasion, GraystonLynch and William "Rip" Robertson. It was only in thelast chapter that Wyden presented at least some idea of the reality of theCold War (324-25). By March, doubts concerning the operation were being expressed in theWhite House. Michael Beschloss' The Crisis Years, on the other hand, dealt withthe rivalry between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev.As a result, its treatment of the Bay of Pigs was not as extensive as thatfound in Wyden's book; on the other hand, it dealt with an issue onlytouched upon by Wyden: the relationship between the Bay of Pigs operationand U.S./Soviet relations. The author examined the operation through the prism of politicalscience, rather than history, in order to evaluate the decision-makingprocess. The last radiotransmission from the brigade commander, at 2:3 P.M., stated that he wasordering the destruction of all equipment and communications in preparationfor surrender (Kesaris 28). Unopposed, these aircraft could wreck the invasionfleet. At dawn, however, theCuban Air Force began flying airstrikes against the beachhead and the shipsunloading supplies. Of course, most of this information was not new; similar rumors hadfloated for many years. By this time, American reservations concerningCastro were so strong that the Eisenhower administration had imposed anembargo upon Cuban sugar. Consequently, undamaged Cuban fighters caused heavylosses amongst the exile bombers and the invasion force lost two of itsmain supply ships and most of its ammunition within the first hours of theinvasion. He now viewed Kennedy as weak and incompetent;the time for a move on Berlin could not be better (Beschloss 149-5 ). The initial training camps were located in Floridaand their existence was no real secret to local residents and journalists.Latin American journalists were also aware of the huge training camps beingconstructed in Guatemala by October of 196 ; the New York Times reportedtheir existence and U.S. According to Wyden, the American intelligenceofficials and political leaders did not understand the Cuban revolution andthe mindset of the Cuban people. The Cuban Air Force was known to possesstwin-engine B-26 light bombers and single-engine Sea Fury fighters, bothpiston-engine aircraft of World War II vintage. Wyden did made similar arguments, although in lessdetail. Paterson seemed to ignore the Soviet element in Kennedy'smotivation in authorizing the Bay of Pigs operation, focusing solely onCuba. On the other hand,the authors gave these allegations precedence over other, more valuableinformation. Some of the pilots drove off Cubanfighters by diving on them and flying close to them. The brigade lacked the necessaryequipment to fight it out with the Cuban forces and eventually lacked theammunition to even sustain the beachhead beyond three days. The initial plan called for organizing and training a number ofparamilitary cadres, composed of Cuban exiles, which were to then beinserted into Cuba to recruit and train resistance forces. TheEssex was normally assigned to antisubmarine duty and was normally equippedonly with slow propeller-driven aircraft and helicopters. New York: Oxford UP, 1989: 123-155.Prados, John. After inspecting the Guatemala bases, the Joint Chiefs againstated that while the operation had a good chance of success, there werestill many logistical problems to be worked out and the fleet beingassembled to carry the brigade to Cuba was particularly vulnerable to airattack. By 1 A.M., the freighters, Houston and Rio Escondido,had been sunk, along with most of the brigade's ammunition, by rocketsfired from Sea Furys (Kesaris 22-23). Casualties amongst the Cuban forces under Castroare unknown. (Ed.). New York: William Morrow and Co., 1986.Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. At that time he gave no indication that he wished for any changes(Wyden 68). Wyden particularly made itclear that the CIA and other American estimates of Castro's "shaky"popularity amongst the Cuban people were wrong. During the Revolution, Fidel Castro tapped into the resentmentagainst the United States residing in the psyches of the Cuban peasants.This resentment was never completely understood by most of the Americandiplomats and intelligence analysts, who were never able to understand oraccept Castro's popularity amongst the Cuban people (Paterson 128). Prados' account challenged none of theprevious accounts, such as Wyden's, although it did provide more, and moreaccurate, information than the other works concerning the organization andequipment of both the Cuban armed forces and the exile Cuban Brigade. In his book, Bay of Pigs, Wyden pointed out that Richard Bissell,Deputy Director for Plans in the CIA and chief architect of the invasion,was a Yale intellectual whose previous claim to fame within the agency wasthe development of the U-2 spy plane and reconnaissance satellites (11).Bissell was not an individual who had developed a taste for covertoperations in his early years; in fact, he had no personal experience incovert operations (12). If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.