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NIXON & CHINA.   Term Paper ID:21274 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Origins & evolution of opening of China-U.S. relations through Nixon foreign policy, dispute over role of Kissinger, objectives, U.S. public reaction, role of Sino-Soviet conflict & Vietnam War, success/failure, historical impact.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Origins & evolution of opening of China-U.S. relations through Nixon foreign policy, dispute over role of Kissinger, objectives, U.S. public reaction, role of Sino-Soviet conflict & Vietnam War, success/failure, historical impact. Paper Introduction: Nixon and China: A Historiography This paper will present a historiography of the United States policy towards the Peoples Republic of China during the Nixon administration. The first part of the paper will briefly recount the events surrounding the policy, including the change in foreign policy during the administration and the public spectacle of the Nixon visit to China. The second part of the paper will examine the interpretations concerning the true authorship of the policy introduced by the administration, specifically focusing upon the question of whether Nixon or Kissinger was primarily responsible for the idea of rapprochement with China. The third part of the paper will discuss the motivations behind the change in policy and the interpretations of these motivations. The fourth part of the paper will look at the interpretati Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. The primary areas of interest were the USSR and Taiwan. [22]Thornton, 23-25. The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times. could not maintain a nuclear monopoly or even superiority, so themilitary could only retaliate against an attack. Eriksson, 1972.Wicker, Tom. The second part ofthe paper will examine the interpretations concerning the true authorshipof the policy introduced by the administration, specifically focusing uponthe question of whether Nixon or Kissinger was primarily responsible forthe idea of rapprochement with China. Although détente between the U.S. The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon. Since the United States could nolonger assert dominance in view of Soviet and Chinese power, it had toaccommodate the two communist countries by negotiating with them.[8] Oneof the more interesting views of power in the administration was writtenbefore the public announcement of the new China policy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 198 .Melanson, Richard A. The policy represented an innovative and far-thinkingapproach combined with an excellent sense of timing with regard to seizingan opportunity.[42] Sulzberger contrasts the diplomatic coup representedby the move with the then emerging Watergate scandal.[43] Parmet says thatNixon was at his peak the week of the summit in Beijing.[44] Lord Langfordsays that Nixon's policy and trip broke new diplomatic ground because thesharp differences between the United States and China were not glossed overbut brought out into the open in a frank manner. policy towards Chinahad to be changed independently of each other prior to Nixon's election.On the other hand, Kissinger admits that he did not have political strengthor bureaucratic clout to implement the policy on his own. [29]C.L. made it clear that it was notabandoning Taiwan and reaffirmed its intention to remain in South Korea andJapan. would form analliance against the Soviets.[24] Although Melanson gives this reasoningonly minor importance in the overall scheme of foreign policy devised byNixon and Kissinger, it was an important motivation with regard to thespecific China policy.[25] Thornton suggests that Nixon began to placepressure on Moscow via China as early as the Spring of 1969, when the Sino-Soviet border conflict threatened to escalate into all-out war. BibliographyAllen, Gary. in the event of a communist offensive.[34] How did the American Public View the Policy Change? The idea was simple and had a moral appeal.But the strategy became an end itself as Soviet aggression diminished andthe perceived threat receded. Sulzberger claims that while Nixon had studied thepossibilities of opening China since the middle years of the 196 s, hisvisit would not have occurred except for the Sino-Soviet conflict.[29]Nixon himself said that his visit to China "was an act of cold,dispassionate pragmatism." His motivation was the security of the UnitedStates and his belief that this security could be best served by improvingrelations with one communist power that was in conflict with another,stronger, communist power.[3 ] Most commentators agree that during his first term, the main priorityof Nixon was ending the war in Vietnam. During the 194 s and 195 s, the publicbelieved that communists, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, didindeed plan on dominating the world and that the United States had to"contain" this aggression. In one way, says Ambrose, the trip was simply another shift inalignment, such as had been going on for centuries. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 199 .Reichley, A. Fear ofthe USSR had brought about the meeting in the first place and both leadersagreed to cooperate in the event of hostilities with the USSR and to opposeattempts by the USSR at hegemony in the region.[6] There are four main issues which need to be addressed when discussingthe China policy of the Nixon administration. [12]Michael E. The Cold War policy of containment was abolished and the UnitedStates ceased to treat the Soviet Union and China as part of a giantconspiracy against freedom and democracy. Although he hadnot mentioned it during the campaign, Nixon had also formulated new ideasconcerning relation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Martin's Press, 1991), 55-56. In a similar vein, manywriters have been influenced by ideology and/or personal feelings;defenders and detractors of the Nixon administration often feel itnecessary to justify their positions in their interpretations of events.Consequently, interpretations vary and several works must be consulted inorder to gain a truly balanced portrait of the foreign policy of the Nixonadministration. It is undisputed that by the Spring of 1971, Nixon and Chou En-laiwere exchanging messages through intermediaries aimed at setting up aconference between the U.S. [45]Langford, 82-94. [26]Thornton, 21-22. Thus, he claims to have possessed alonger-term view than Nixon, who was more of a short-term opportunist.[7]Kissinger's personal view has been supported by John Robert Greene.Although Greene does not assert that Nixon simply saw détente and thenormalization of relations with China as a means of ending the Vietnam War,he does argue that Nixon was not really trying to create a newinternational relations structure but was instead reacting to the realityof reduced American power in the world. James. In asurprising twist on the traditional impressions of both men, Nixon hasgenerally received the award for conceiving the overall policy shift.Indeed, A. [39]Jerry Voorhis, The Strange Case of Richard Milhous Nixon (NewYork: Paul S. [46]Ambrose, 512-19. [41]Ambrose, 512-19. Nixon and China: A Historiography This paper will present a historiography of the United States policytowards the Peoples Republic of China during the Nixon administration. Thornton, The Nixon-Kissinger Years: ReshapingAmerica's Foreign Policy (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 24-25. Whilesome argue that the policy died with the election of Ronald Reagan, aftersuffering through a lingering illness during the Ford and Carteradministrations, others assert that the policy reshaped the relationshipwith China, and the Soviet Union, and was successful in developing closerties between the United States and the two communist countries. Kissinger made a second secret trip to China in Novemberof 1971 to prepare for the Beijing summit. Not only was this necessary forachieving peace within the United States, it was also necessary forreconfiguring the international scene. The Soviet Union was drawn intonegotiations concerning the limitation of nuclear weapons and diplomaticchannels were opened up with China as a first step in ending the imposedisolation. Allen then said that Kissinger was placed inthe administration to facilitate the great communist conspiracy to form aworld government.[9] Others, however, have tended to give more credit to Nixon. [35]Melanson, 59-68. Kissinger's popularity rose asdetails of his influence in formulating this policy became public and Nixonreportedly became jealous.[4] At this same time the U.N. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1979.Langford, Lord. [49]Greene, 232. It must be remembered that thispolicy represented a reversal of the policy of containment and was intendedto create a stable international system of balanced power. In addition, almost all are in agreement thatthe policy would not have been possible without Nixon; even Kissingerfreely admits that he himself could never have implemented the policy.Second, although there is no true consensus as to the motivations behindthe policy, it appears that Nixon was motivated by a realization that theUnited States could no longer mold the world as it wished and that somesort of power balance had to be sought. [48]Thornton, 289-324. [36]Jonathan Schell, The Time of Illusion (New York: Alfred Knopf,1976), 172; Genovese, 147. The onlybreakthrough was on the part of Nixon himself, who reversed his own long-standing positions. [44]Parmet, 621. [3 ]Richard Nixon, In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, andRenewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 ), 287-88. In addition, however, détente receded during the late 197 s asthe conservatives became resurgent in American politics and the SovietUnion embarked on new, aggressive adventures. His visit had been announced a meresix months earlier and there had been little public notice that thetraditional U.S. [31]Melanson, 56. Those who were part of the administration have tended tofocus upon a clash of personalities, especially between Secretary of StateWilliam Rogers and Kissinger.[4 ] Ambrose states that some in the StateDepartment considered the agreement disastrous because it did not mentionthe U.S. and China. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.Garthoff, Raymond L. The third part of the paper willdiscuss the motivations behind the change in policy and the interpretationsof these motivations. One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream. New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 .Parmet, Herbert S. [7]Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1979), 163-64. He quickly foundout, however, that this promise was going to be nearly impossible to keepand he actually ordered the expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia, aswell as a stepped up bombing campaign in North Vietnam. Who was the Author of the Policy? [19]The Nixon Doctrine (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institutefor Public Policy Research, 1972), 5-6. retreat fromVietnam was already under way. In an article in the journalForeign Policy in 1967, Nixon argued that the United States was no longerstrong enough to act as the "world's policeman" in Asia and that it couldno longer afford to keep China out of the normal discourse between nations. This assessment has been concurred withby most writers on the subject, as well as by Nixon and Kissingerthemselves. Thefirst part of the paper will briefly recount the events surrounding thepolicy, including the change in foreign policy during the administrationand the public spectacle of the Nixon visit to China. Its author, GaryAllen, stridently claimed that Henry Kissinger was the man behind thepolicy changes of the Nixon administration, which became apparent soonafter Nixon's inauguration. [18]Melanson, 55-68. Consequently, few saw any problem with normalizedrelations with China.[35] Although many in Nixon's administration hadexpected some problems convincing Americans that rapprochement was right,most commentators agree that, while startled, most Americans applauded themove.[36] Most also agree that the only real resistance came from the right-wing of the Republican Party, particularly those who believed that Taiwanhad been "sold out."[37] Ambrose says that during the summit Nixonexplained his delicate political situation in the United States concerningTaiwan and said that he would come under political fire if he agreed to theremoval of American troops from the island. Regardless of the success of the policy itself, therelationships between the three powers were transformed during the Nixonadministration. Kissinger had a far reaching view of internationalrelations, one which envisioned the creation of a stable internationalstructure in which no one country possessed substantially greater powerthan the others. [4]Ambrose, 453, 479-8 . Since Nixon's first visit to China, there have been several sourcesof dispute between writers and commentators. The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design. The Limits of Power: The Nixon and Ford Administrations. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981.Schell, Jonathan. [25]Melanson, 56-57. [24]Greene, 1 6-1 7. Eriksson, 1972), 248. Nixon also simply didwhat long-time critics of U.S. This was aimed at getting Moscow to agree to a summit between Nixonand Brezhnev later in the year. The meetings between Nixon and Chou similarly consisted ofnothing new, but both took advantage of the visual impression of themeetings. [13]Richard C. Thornton says that the Soviet Union may have figured thathostilities would intimidate China from becoming friendly with the UnitedStates but that the exact opposite happened.[23] This conflict providedthe United States with the opportunity to play one country against theother, securing concessions from both. The World and Richard Nixon. [9]Gary Allen, Nixon's Palace Guard (Boston: Western Islands, 1971),35-63. The U.S. Martin's Press, 1991.The Nixon Doctrine. Although these criticismsreportedly angered Nixon, Kissinger orally reaffirmed U.S. White House Years. Kissinger arguesthat there was a minor difference between himself and the President as toperspectives concerning the policy shift. [37]Greene, 112. Ambrose claims that the trip merelyreflected reality and brought little change to Asia. Finally,there is no consensus as to the success or failure of the policy. During the Summer of 1971,Kissinger was sent to China secretly in order to set up an agenda for themeeting. Although popular writers tend to focusupon the supposed moral bankruptcy of the administration and the paranoiaof Nixon himself, political and diplomatic historians of late TwentiethCentury America have long pointed out the importance of the Nixon foreignpolicy. Henderson, Jr., The Nixon Theology (New York: Harper &Row, 1972), 157-73. The two prime architects ofthe policy, Nixon and Kissinger, have themselves added fuel to thedisputes, although using their memoirs as sources must be done with care,since both have (had) large egos to placate. [6]Ibid., 512-19. Melanson says that thepublic appeal of containment had evaporated as Communist aggression becameless of a perceived threat. treaty obligations to Taiwan. The Nixon administration tried to get the Soviet Union andChina to place pressure on the North Vietnamese, but these efforts were notcompletely successful. Henry Kissinger was no politicianbut an academic who had acquired a positive reputation in the arena of U.S.foreign policy. In spite of sniping from rightwing critics and Democrats accusing him of election posturing, Nixoncontinued to enjoy popularity for his peace overtures, especially as hepublicly ordered the withdrawal of large numbers of American troops fromVietnam.[5] Nixon left for China on February 17 amidst overwhelming presscoverage. [51]Schurmann, 375-76. Vol. Thornton asserts that this was the beginning ofSoviet reactive moves as the U.S.-China relationship developed.[26] Greenesuggests that the Sino-Soviet split was the main impetus for Nixon'sdecision to normalize relations with China and that this normalization wassecond only to ending the Vietnam War on a list of foreign policypriorities.[27] The theme of pragmatism recurs throughout most works on Nixon,especially concerning his foreign policy, and nothing could be morepragmatic than using the Sino-soviet conflict to gain an edge on the SovietUnion.[28] C. In addition,Nixon loved "drama, surprise, and confounding his enemies" and nothingcould be more dramatic or surprising than negotiating for peace with thecommunist superpowers.[2 ] Somewhat less dramatically, Greene says thatNixon was not after "unchecked trust" with the two communist countries, butan understanding that nuclear war would be devastating to all involved.Detente was a diplomatic necessity in the 197 s because the United Statescould no longer enforce its will on countries who could seek the backing ofthe Soviet Union or China.[21] As will be examined below, the Vietnam Warfigured prominently in the decisions which led to the rapprochement withChina. On the other hand, he agrees thatdétente as an overall policy failed once Nixon resigned.[49] Genovese says that the failure of the Nixon foreign policy during theFord administration must be partially blamed on Congress, which sought agreater role in the making of foreign policy.[5 ] Schurmann admits thefailure of détente in the late 197 s, but asserts that Nixon's negotiationswith China and the Soviet Union resulted in benefits outside the frameworkof the overall policy. relationship with China evolved into a "quasi-alliance" between the two countries, involving economic and military ties.Unlike Kissinger, Nixon did not really have some grand design for aninternational power structure in mind when he developed his policy forrapprochement with China. [3]Stephen E. Richard Nixon and His America. [5 ]Genovese, 162. The Nixon Theology. [17]Franz Schurmann, The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The GrandDesign (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1987), 22-25. Although these exchanges and arrangements were secret, Nixon hintedat an impending change when he announced on June 1 that trade restrictionswith China would be eased. Nixon also brought a very important player into his administrationwho thought along nearly the same lines. The entire trip itself consistedmainly of sight-seeing and banquets, rather than lengthy and in-depthnegotiations. Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War. By Nixon's own pragmatic standards, then, hispolicy ultimately succeeded, despite the death of détente.[51] Conclusion Despite the widely varying opinions concerning the China policy ofthe Nixon administration, a few conclusions can be developed. China policy had been advocating. Witness to Power: The Nixon Years. and the Soviet Union wasleft in tatters by renewed Soviet aggression in the late 197 s and early198 s, the two countries did not return to the Cold War of the 195 s andearly 196 s; the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev saw to that. At the same time, he ended the requirement thathalf of all U.S. He says thatNixon viewed a Vietnam settlement as a necessity for the establishment of along-term relationship with China. He credits Nixon with a positive change in outlook and an attemptto reshape international relations. According to Thornton, the Chinese hadalready begun to make the same linkage, especially when they began reducingthe amount of Soviet supplies traveling along the Chinese rail system intoNorth Vietnam.[32] Similarly, Garthoff says that the Chinese made someserious efforts at persuading the North Vietnamese to compromise before theNixon visit; however, Chinese influence with Hanoi was not as great as hadbeen thought by the Americans.[33] Ambrose goes so far as to argue that itwas not in the interest of the Chinese to force a quick and peaceful end tothe war. [23]Thornton, 12-15. The U.S. foreign policy, a changewhich has become one of the two hallmarks of the Nixon presidency (theother being the Watergate scandal). New York: St. Genovese has called it the greatest diplomatic success ofthe administration which tilted the political balance in Asia towards theUnited States. [47]Melanson, 68-76. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-SovietRelations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1985), 214. Thornton lists two other reasons: the Sino-Soviet Conflict and theopening of China to Western economic influences.[22] Throughout the 196 s, it became apparent to Western observers thatChina and the Soviet Union did not have the close relationship which hadbeen attributed to them since the revolution in China. The last part of the paper will present interpretations ofthe overall effect of the policy and its success or failure. 2), The Triumph of a Politician,1962-1972 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 451-53, 48 -82. [4 ]John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power: The Nixon Years (New York:Simon and Schuster, 1982), 296-3 . New York: Random House, 1991. [38]Ambrose, 512-19. The U.S. [8]Greene, 1 6-1 7. pullout couldnot, however, take place precipitously, leaving South Vietnam at the mercyof the North. foreign policy.Nixon is generally regarded as the opportunist, using his long experienceas a politician to recognize opportunities as they materialized and seizethem before they slipped away. New York: Paragon House, 1989.Voorhis, Jerry. Kissinger has claimedthat he and Nixon came to the conclusion that the U.S. He simplysays that Nixon modified the policy of containment to reflect the newreality of power in the world.[13] One of the more eloquent advocates ofNixon as policy author is Lord Langford, who describes Nixon as having a"peace-loving vision" of a new world beyond the Cold War.[14] Such anaccolade may seem odd when applied to a president who escalated the air warin Vietnam and who had long been an inveterate enemy of socialism in anyform; Charles Henderson says so much in a complicated evaluation of Nixon'sreligious philosophy and presidential actions.[15] Stephen Ambrose saysthat Nixon was the person responsible for most of the ideas concerningforeign policy during the first term of his administration[16] Many have apportioned credit between the two men, acceptingKissinger's claim that they both envisioned the new policy independent ofeach other prior to Nixon's election. First, who was the trueauthor of the policy, Nixon or Kissinger? What is almost as remarkable as the change in policy itself isthat this change was carried out by one of the most hardline Cold Warriorsof the 195 s. Melanson also says that Nixon's publicrelations campaign convinced Americans that new world realities had madecontainment obsolete. An understanding had to be reached wherebythe countries involved would acknowledge their differences but agree tocoexist peacefully.[19] According to Ambrose, Nixon had realized that thepatterns established early in the Cold War were no longer realistic. [34]Ambrose, 451-53. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.Nixon, Richard. [42]Genovese, 145-46. Building more nuclearweapons was no solution because the USSR would match the buildup and Chinawas beginning to build its own nuclear weapons. TheU.S. When Richard Nixon assumed office in 1969, the most important problemfacing American foreign policymakers was the continuing war in Vietnam.Nixon had campaigned partly on the promise that he would end Americaninvolvement in the war without betraying South Vietnam. troop withdrawal and opposing a "two-China" formula. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985.Genovese, Michael E. Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixon and Ford Administrations. Some sort of agreement with the North would have to bereached and the survival of the South would have to be assured, lest theUnited States lose credibility with the rest of the world. James Reichley asserts that Kissinger was initially skeptical ofa new policy towards China, although he had written a position paper forNelson Rockefeller in 1968 advocating that China be encouraged to developconstructive relationships with the rest of the world.[1 ] Reichley hasbeen supported in this view by Raymond Garthoff, who says that Kissingerwas intellectually insecure when it came to Chinese affairs.[11]Similarly, Richard Thornton and Michael Genovese assert that Nixon was thereal author of the policy towards China and deserves most of the credit forthe resulting success.[12] Thornton says that Kissinger did not initiallysee the connection between the China policy and the Vietnam peacenegotiations; on the other hand, Thornton does not claim that Nixonpossessed a far-reaching goal for a new international structure. The highlights were the meetings withChairman Mao Zedong, during which Nixon was enthralled. [28]Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (NewYork: Random House, 1991), 576-83; Herbert S. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1987.Sulzberger, C.L. The Time of Illusion. New York: Greenwood Press, 199 .Greene, John Robert. [33]Garthoff, 255-56. In his statement, Nixon acknowledged the Chinese claimsand reaffirmed an interest in a peaceful settlement by the Chinesethemselves.[38] Jerry Voorhis asserts that most Americans did not objectto the ultimate goal of removing all U.S. obligations toTaiwan on the last day of the summit.[41] The Overall Impact of the New China Policy There has been surprisingly little dispute over the impact of Nixon'sChina policy. Loss ofcredibility would doom the new foreign policy.[31] Thornton similarlylinks the situation in Vietnam with the China negotiations. According to Stephen Ambrose, Kissinger promised the Chinese thatthe U.S. Nixon decided tomount no opposition to the admission but pursued a "two-China" policy,recognizing the legitimacy of both the mainland and Taiwan, which would beallowed to stay in the General Assembly. Consisting oflittle substance, the meetings were am opportunity for Mao to convey hisincredible intelligence nonetheless. The Nixon-Kissinger Years: Reshaping America's Foreign Policy. With regard tothis question, most commentators are in agreement: the policy of detenteand the new balance of power died with the administration of Gerald Ford.Melanson argues that while the China policy was successful in its initialgoal, the overall policy of détente towards both China and the Soviet Unionwas a failure. Fourth, what effect did the policy have on subsequent Americanforeign policy after the Nixon administration? Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon (New York: PrenticeHall Press, 1987), 75-91. 2, The Triumph of a Politician, 1962- 1972. Parmet, Richard Nixon and HisAmerica (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 199 ), 62 -24. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change: The Nixonand Ford Administrations (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution,1981), 115-16. The American press hadlittle but praise for the action, which went along well with the SALT talkswith the Soviets. In this sense, Melanson argues that the change in foreignpolicy was not principally caused by the deteriorating situation inVietnam, but that the change could not take place unless the United Statescould extricate itself from the Indochina mess. [32]Thornton, 14-15. [5]Ibid. Third, there does seem to be aconsensus that the policy was overwhelmingly accepted by the majority ofAmericans, in spite of some resistance from the conservative wing of theRepublican Party and jealous bureaucrats in the State Department. The U.S. The fourth part of the paper will look at theinterpretations concerning the reactions of the American people to thepolicy change. He was ready to jettison the traditional policy of containment, which hadbeen directed at all communist nations. Langford is profuse in his praise for Nixon concerning the Chinapolicy, not only because it represented a significant warming of relationsbut also because it was a very clever move to place pressure on the SovietUnion for negotiations.[45] There are a few dissenters, however, from the notion that the policywas an innovative and radical change. In addition, he pragmaticallyseized the opportunity presented by the Sino-Soviet conflict to implementhis policy towards China when he did. to withdraw from Vietnambefore the 1972 election without overthrowing the Thieu government in theSouth. voted to admit China. The China trip was quickly followed by a summit with the leaderof the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, in Moscow. He saysthat Nixon sent secret diplomatic messages to Moscow hinting that the U.S.would support the Chinese in the event of war. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.Kissinger, Henry. troops from Taiwan, in spite ofthe traditional posture of the government since the 194 s.[39] Some bureaucratic resistance also arose, as Nixon and Kissingeressentially bypassed the State Department in formulating and implementingthe China policy. Third, how was the policy viewed by the American public atthe time? Nixon's Palace Guard. Domestic peace was required inorder for the administration to acquire support for the radical change inforeign policy. This way, the power of bothcommunist countries would be checked and they would be unlikely to pursuecloser relations with each other. He notes thatNixon not only had the instinct for formulating the basis of the policy,but also had the political experience to implement it. would withdraw all troops from Taiwan if the Chinese agreed to asummit in Beijing. They had already realized that the North Vietnamese were going tobe their main competitor in Asia; thus, they more than willing to let theNorth be bombed by the U.S. Melanson, Reconstructing Consensus: American ForeignPolicy since the Vietnam War (New York: St. [1 ]A. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976.Schurmann, Franz. [16]Ambrose, 655. Franz Schurmann argues that Nixon was theoriginator of the ideas but he does not say that Nixon had some granddesign for international relations, as has been attributed to Kissinger.Instead, Schurmann says that Nixon was primarily responsible for the policybecause he was able to recognize the opportunity presented by the Sino-Soviet conflict in the late 196 s; Nixon's grand design, according toSchurmann, was to manipulate the growing rift between the Soviet Union andChina in order to ultimately save the world from communism.[17] Melansondoes not distinguish between the two when examining the policy.[18] Motivation behind the Change in Policy Just as there is dispute as to who was really responsible fordevising the change in policy, there is also some argument as to why theNixon and Kissinger thought the policy needed changing. This was partially due to Watergate, as most Americansbegan to view each new détente event as an attempt to regain lostpopularity. Chous's paragraph in thesummit agreement concerning Taiwan was mild, claiming Taiwan to be a partof the mainland and demanding U.S. Thus, the initial summitwas meant as a sign that two diametrically opposed political systems couldacknowledge their differences and agree to discuss them in a peacefulmanner. This opening of relationswith two of the traditional enemies of the United States signaled adramatic change in the overall direction of U.S. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989.Ehrlichman, John. By opening a new relationship with China, the United Stateswould also encourage the Soviet leaders to seek some sort of negotiationwith the United States, out of fear that China and the U.S. The Chinese also had to effectively agree to putpressure on the North Vietnamese to allow the U.S. Boston: Western Islands, 1971.Ambrose, Stephen E. Nixon: A Study in Extremes of Fortune. Second, what were the reasonsfor the policy? Ambrose, Nixon (Vol. [43]Sulzberger, 75. [2 ]Ambrose, 439. Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. This conflicterupted into violence in 1969 when the two countries became involved in aborder war. [27]Greene, 1 8. Kissinger's secret mission to China inJuly was successful and Nixon got ready for his public trip.[3] The intended visit was announced on July 15 by the administration,which cited the wish to "normalize" relations between China and the U.S.and to "exchange views of concern to the two sides." Americans, andgovernments throughout the world, were stunned but the response wasfavorable, except among the Republican right wing. In addition, he had argued during a speech that the United States shouldpursue negotiations with the Soviet Union to seek ways in which to reducethe tensions between the two superpowers.[1] These two policy objectives,ending the war in Vietnam and repairing relations with China and the SovietUnion, became linked during the Nixon administration, as he saw anopportunity to bring pressure on the North Vietnamese through theircommunist benefactors. Such a structure, Kissinger felt, was necessary forpreserving peace between the major powers and in the world at large.[2] Together, Nixon and Kissinger devised a policy of overallinternational relations which redefined the role of the United States inthe world. ----------------------- [1]John Robert Greene, The Limits of Power: The Nixon and FordAdministrations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 1 6-1 7. Almost all writers agree that the vast majority of Americans saw therapprochement with China as a positive development. In doing so, they have attributeddifferent motives to each man for wanting to change U.S. Genovese, The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics inTurbulent Times (New York: Greenwood Press, 199 ), 146. could not destroythe Communists and they were not going to self-destruct. [11]Raymond L. First, themajority of writers believe that Richard Nixon was the true author of thepolicy towards China, although Kissinger adapted it to his overall schemeof international relations. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.Henderson, Charles P., Jr. [15]Charles P. There has always been some question as to who really devised thechange in policy towards China, Nixon or Kissinger. In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987.Thornton, Richard C. Schurmann thenasserts that the U.S. New York: Paul S. grain shipments to the USSR be shipped aboard U.S.-flaggedships. [14]Lord Langford, Nixon: A Study in Extremes of Fortune (London:Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 198 ), 48. In March of 1972, President Richard Nixon visited the PeoplesRepublic of China, reversing more than twenty years of enforced isolationon the world's most populous nation. Nixon. [21]Greene, 1 6-1 7. [2]Richard A. Because of these messages,the Soviet leaders backed down and Beijing offered to enter intonegotiations with Moscow. Ambrose does admit, however, that Nixon accomplishedthis himself and opened countless opportunities.[46] The bigger question, however, is whether the Nixon and Kissingerforeign policy was successful overall. Aware of the drama involved, he orchestrated proceedings toobtain the full dramatic effect; correspondingly, Chou En-lai arranged thedrama from the Chinese side. policy towards the communist nation was going to bechanged. While Nixon saw it as anopportunity to force the USSR to pressure North Vietnam during the peacenegotiations, Kissinger saw it as an opportunity to change the long-termstructure of international relations. Détente and Kissinger's viewof a new international relations structure died with the election of RonaldReagan.[47] Thornton also agrees that the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policyfell apart by the late 197 s as the Soviets implicitly rejected the goalsof negotiation.[48] Greene is somewhat kinder in his assessment of thepolicy. Most agree thatboth men, especially Nixon, realized that the United States was no longerdominant in the world and that the power of both the Soviet Union and Chinahad grown too much to ignore. L. Rather than aunited communist bloc, the two countries had grown increasingly hostiletowards each other, with China fearing a Soviet invasion. 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