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FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES.   Term Paper ID:24640 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Formation & evolution of parties & impact on politics, 1962-1988. Leadership, campaigns & elections, issues, ideology, domestic & foreign policy.... More...

18 Pages / 4050 Words 14 sources, 49 Citations, TURABIAN Format $72.00 Return to List of Papers

Paper Abstract: Formation & evolution of parties & impact on politics, 1962-1988. Leadership, campaigns & elections, issues, ideology, domestic & foreign policy. Paper Introduction: The increased presidentialism inherent in the structures of the Fifth Republic has led to increasing polarization of French politics, and no party better exemplifies this trend than the Union pour la démocratie française (UDF). Rather than a party in a traditional sense, the UDF is a coalition of small parties whose principal shared characteristic is membership in the non-Gaullist Right. The party was formed in 1978 around then-president Valery Giscard d'Estaing as a means of generating parliamentary support and a base for reelection independent of the Gaullist majority. From the beginning the UDF coalition lacked a uniform set of principles and goals, and throughout its history it has often been difficult to distinguish its positions from those of the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la république (RPR). Despite some electoral successes the UDF remained the Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. This loose organization was in keeping withGiscard's desire to adhere to his principle of "pluralism withunity."[44] But, when it came to issues on which the rival factionscould reach no agreement, there was no mechanism in place to deal withrecalcitrance nor any authority that could make a binding decision.Barre prevailed, when Giscard failed to demonstrate a return to favorin the opinion polls, and he was put forward as the only UDFcandidate. Certainly his frequent exercise ofArticle 49, which allowed the president to by-pass the NationalAssembly and declare a law approved when it was deemed essential tothe executive's action, was not in keeping with his declared desire toachieve a better balance between the executive and parliament. A general distrust of "uncontrolled capitalism," for example,led the Gaullists to propose that the government assume responsibilityfor actively promoting "the modernization and expansion of theeconomy."[27] For Giscard, however, only the liberty of unregulatedcompetition would produce a growing economy and he sought what hecalled, in 1977, an "advanced liberal society" for which basicliberties--for private enterprise, from governmental economicintervention, and of educational choice--had to be defended.[28] Thisliberalism also extended to liberty from trade unions and strikes,whose interference in the operations of the purely competitive marketwere construed as an infringement on the liberty to compete. New York: St. "Candidates and Parties of the Right." In Electing the French President: The 1995 Presidential Election, ed. Giscard's group adopted the RI label and had 2 candidates elected to the National Assembly in the 1962 election. John Gaffney and Eva Kolinsky, 69-9 . Thanks tothe legacy of Charles de Gaulle the Constitution conceived of thepresident as "an arbiter above political institutions."[1] This meantthat presidents were to be elected on their own merits, rather than asthe leaders of political parties. But now, in the face of François Mitterand'schallenge of a united Left, it was Giscard's RI, along with the Centredes démocrates sociaux (CDS) and the Parti républicain radical etradical socialiste (Radicals)--whom Giscard strove to bring into themajority, that held the balance of power. To many voters atthe time the RPR and the Republicans were "hardly distinguishable inbroad programmatic terms."[25] Giscard had concentrated on the areas of economic policy and onEuropean and Atlantic questions as his principal points of differencewith the Gaullists. But without Giscardor some immediate threat to the right, the UDF's survival must, onceagain, be considered tenuous. After the defeat of 1981, Giscard's career "seemed to be interminal decline" and he withdrew from national politics until the1986 parliamentary elections produced a victory for the Center-Right.[42] Spurred on by hope, Giscard reentered the fray and triedto preempt Raymond Barre's run for the presidency. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 199 .Evans, G. The first wasthe Centre des démocrates sociaux (CDS) , the "heir to the ChristianDemocrat movement that had existed under various names from the 194 sto the 197 s," and was then under the leadership of Jean Lecaunet.[3]The second group was the Parti républicain radical et radicalsocialiste (Radicals) of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, whichrepresented a conservative secular tradition, as opposed to the CDS'ssocial Catholicism. With the RPR "maintaining a critical and separate position"within the government coalition and Chirac actively co-optingGiscard's domestic positions and appealing to many Republicans andtheir allies, Giscard was forced to realize that he could not forge asingle entity supportive of his reelection from the Rightmajority.[21] Badly in need of an electoral base for the future, mostof Giscard's obstacles came from within his own party. London: Routledge, 1991.Stevens, Anne. London: Macmillan, 1996.Giscard d'Estaing, Valery. As Fysh noted, the Right has thus farfailed to consolidate in the same way the Left has done. Had Giscard, or some more serious UDF candidate, run as wellthe Right would have been too severely divided to counteract the pullof the united Left--even when it had a relatively weak candidate.Since that candidate turned out to have a surprising strength, theRight clearly needs to rethink its divided status and this might,again, spell the end of the UDF. N. The Republican group deriveddirectly from the Centre national des independents et paysans (CNIP),a party that had an average of 13% of the vote in National Assemblyelections of the Fourth Republic and had more seats after 1958 thananyone but the Gaullists. Chirac noted that the RI, the biggest part of Giscard'ssupport, "could not possibly lay claim to progressivism or centrismbut, on the contrary, was solidly conservative."[36] Giscard needed to appeal, therefore, both to supporters ofeconomic liberalism, his base, and to a broader share of theelectorate who would be attracted by mild social reform and agenerally Centrist cast of thought. In 1973, when the Republicans had a total of 55 deputies, theemerging threat of a Socialist-Communist alliance forced bargainingbetween the Gaullists and a number of opposition Centrists(Reformateurs). This,combined with Chirac's need to counteract Giscard's appeal to theCenter, led him to change positions on both domestic and foreignpolicies. [11]François Petry, "Fragile Mandate: Party Programmes and PublicExpenditures in the French Fifth Republic," European Journal of PoliticalResearch 14 (1991): 155.[12]Roy Pierce, "Toward the Formation of a Partisan Alignment in France,"Political Behavior 14 (1992): 451.[13]Ibid., 449.[14]Wilson, 146.[15]Searls, 14.[16]Wilson, 145.[17]Alistair Cole, "The Evolution of the Party System, 1974-199 ," inFrench Political Parties in Transition, ed. By withdrawing from local elections where theCentrists were the stronger candidates the Gaullists assured thedefeat of the Left coalition by ensuring the election of theReformateurs. Prominent UDF leaders offered no support for the idea, and manyactually supported Edouard Balladur and Jacques Chirac, the twoGaullist candidates, in preference to Giscard. Thisdid not mean, of course, that the Republicans could put together a non-Gaullist majority. Theirony was that as the Right cohered into a coalition--even though itwas split between the mistrustful RPR and UDF--its relative solidarityengendered a corresponding need for greater solidarity on the Left.Thus, as Gaullism "outgrew the traditional partisan divisions andbecame the dominant pole around which a stable Center-Rightpresidential majority was built," the Leftist governing pole emergedin response.[11] Where the Right had always been able to maintain itsparliamentary majority in the 196 s and 197 s, thank to theRepublicans and the UDF, there were now two decidedly "broad competingelectoral coalitions."[12] By 1988 Pierce found that more than 4 % ofvoters identified with a Left-oriented party, while only 3 % claimedparties of the Right. Their advance came largely at the expense of theRPR, and this "improvement in UDF strength relative to the Gaullistswas maintained in the 198 s."[39] This was largely due to the party'sability to attract second-ballot votes "beyond their expected base ofsupport," as the Socialists often did.[4 ] This was precisely thesort of scenario the UDF hoped for in 1981. [2]Ibid., 12. But, as the UDF was todiscover, the bipolarizing trend of politics had grown so strong thatit "made the construction of powerful Centrist parties difficult."[38] The UDF did well in the 1978 parliamentary elections, gainingalmost 25% of the vote on the second ballot and a significant increasein Assembly seats. French Politics under the Fifth Republic. The Republicans, who adopted the name Fedération nationale desrepublicains independents (FNRI) in 1966, continued to attract moredeputies and, by the 1967 elections, "had established themselves as aseparate political force."[14] This was primarily due to Giscard'sefforts as, following his departure from the government in 1966, heworked at the difficult problems of making a disciplined party out ofa group of independents and building a Republican base "amongst anelectorate who were traditionally suspicious of politicalparties."[15] The 1974 elections were the turning point for the evolvingparty. New York: Longman, 1991.Searls, Ella. David S. [8]Evans, 51. A final important element in the UDF was the Clubsperspectives et réalités, youth and student organizations "which weresympathetic to, but not directly affiliated to, the RepublicanParty."[6] The UDF, being centered around Giscard and constantly subject tointernal stress from the conflicts among its member parties, was notexpected to last much beyond Giscard's term--or terms. The Gaullists had seen themselves as the force that wouldfederate the Right. The Republicans, having begun in 1962 with the declared intent"to support de Gaulle's work and to collaborate loyally with thegovernment," worked as part of the Gaullist coalition that ensured thestability of the Right-oriented majority throughout the 196 s.[16]But the RI, especially with the absorption of so many Centrists, movedgradually away from the Gaullists. Governmental austerity was their by-word. Martin's Press, 1982.Schlesinger, Joseph A., and Mildred Schlesinger. It was just such a situation that brought about the formation ofthe UDF, a true parti du président. This notion led him to reward Chirac's assistance in theelection with the post of prime minister. The French Polity. In foreign policy, so long as de Gaulle's extremist views werein force, the Republicans expressed a reluctance to underminealliances with the United States and the rest of Western Europe.Giscard also claimed a decidedly stronger leaning toward Europeanunification. The UDF's unique position is theresult of the method by which, under the pressure of Giscard'spresidential ambitions, the Republicans and then the UDF were formed.Though Giscard certainly hoped at all times to overcome the RPR andadvance the Republicans or the UDF to center stage, the course theGiscardians took from the beginning created the successes they were toenjoy as the most powerful of junior partners. Indeed the Gaullists controlled 6 % of thecoalition's majority. As president, Giscard d'Estaing abolished price controls andsubsidies to private and public enterprises. [9]Wilson, 191. F. "The Return of the Orleanist Right: The Union for French Democracy." In French Political Parties in Transition, ed. BibliographyCole, Alistair. The significant difference between Left andRight party adherence was, however, that while "leftists wereoverwhelmingly attached to the Socialist party . But Chirac was unwillingto turn the Right and the presidency over to Giscard for a secondtime. In 1976,recognizing that much of the Republicans' dangerous position stemmedfrom the lack of a clear party program, Giscard set out to define (or,in the light of his emerging presidential performance, re-define)Giscardism. F. He was now the only major Right leader who was nottainted by recent failure. Thisstrategy was also adopted by the RPR, who did not, of course, favoreconomic liberalism of the same degree, but did want a reputation formild progressivism and as a populist party. But Giscard was not concerned primarily with thehealth of the UDF, except as a means "to revive his presidentialambitions," which he did by "walling up the crumbling confederalstructure."[47] These ambitions were, however, extremely unrealistic. Thus, during a presidentialcampaign, party support is easily fractured when candidates, whogenerally "appeal to higher virtues (stability, legitimacy, pluralismand freedom) than those normally espoused by parties," adopt positionsthat trend counter to party or factional interests.[2] Presidentshave also grown increasingly dependent upon their party-based supportin Parliament. Gaullist statism in domestic matters was replaced with"neoliberalism" which featured "deregulation, tax concessions tobusinesses, selective cuts in public spending, and the privatizationof industries, banks, and television networks."[2 ] The extremestatism of Gaullist foreign policy was also modified, though to alesser degree, as Chirac took somewhat more pro-European and pro-Atlanticist positions. "Interview." Europe, May 1997, 17-19.Petry, François. The desire to re-form an autonomous center, however, resulted in"the most serious step so far in the dislocation of the UDF" as theUnion du centre (UDC) parliamentary group was formed by CDSmembers.[46] The UDC had great difficulty in establishing this Centerideal, as Giscard had, even though they were considerably moreCentrist than he had ever been. Withhis withdrawal from the presidential race in 1995, it became clearthat unless the party could move beyond its identification with theformer president's career, ideas, and goals, its survival might be injeopardy. [1 ]James G. "Toward the Formation of a Partisan Alignment in France." Political Behavior 14 (1992): 443-69.Safran, William. Only 73%of the Chirac's first-ballot supporters transferred their votes toGiscard, with 16% abstaining and 11% choosing Mitterand. The increased presidentialism inherent in the structures of theFifth Republic has led to increasing polarization of French politics,and no party better exemplifies this trend than the Union pour ladémocratie française (UDF). Though Chirac was undoubtedly correct inidentifying how far Giscard was from the Center, the Republicans had asuccess with this strategy in 1974--presenting themselves as thealternative to the Gaullists and the Left--and the UDF could see noreason not to continue with it through 1981. In addition, the GaullistJacques Chirac had led a group of 43 Gaullist deputies in support ofGiscard against the official Gaullist candidate Jacques Chaban-Delmas."[17] All these events left the Gaullists in disarray. Addinall (Cardiff:University of Wales Press, 1995), 48. From the beginning the UDFcoalition lacked a uniform set of principles and goals, and throughoutits history it has often been difficult to distinguish its positionsfrom those of the Gaullist Rassemblement pour la république (RPR).Despite some electoral successes the UDF remained the junior partnerin the coalition with the RPR that governed France for over 2 years.Throughout its life the party was, largely, a forum for Giscard. New York: Praeger, 1982.----------------------- [1]Ella Searls, "The Giscardians and Party Politics," in ContemporaryFrench Political Parties, ed. Martin's Press,1982), 12. Alistair Cole (Aldershot,England: Dartmouth, 199 ), 5.[18]Wilson, 179.[19]Anne Stevens, The Government and Politics of France (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1992), 227.[2 ]William Safran, The French Polity, 3d ed. John Gaffney andEva Kolinsky (London: Routledge, 1991), 86. When Giscard withdrewfrom his final attempt to regain the presidency he gave his support toChirac, returning the favor that had gotten him elected years before.But "there was to be no personal recompense," and Giscard was largelyignored by the victorious Chirac.[48] The UDF/RPR coalition has continued and may, since Jospin's riseto prime minister, become essential once again. The party wasformed in 1978 around then-president Valery Giscard d'Estaing as ameans of generating parliamentary support and a base for reelectionindependent of the Gaullist majority. New York: St. But Chirac had his ownambitions--beginning with the leadership of the Gaullist party.Chirac, therefore, resigned as prime minister in 1976 and embarked on"a profound remodeling" of the party; renaming it the Rassemblementpour la république (RPR), initiating a huge membership drive, andconsolidating his leadership position with his election as mayor ofParis in 1977.[19] From 1976 to the early 198 s Chirac and the RPR altered the faceof Gaullism. Aminority, led by Giscard d'Estaing, refused to join in a CNIP-sponsored censure of de Gaulle regarding the constitutionality of thereferendum. But the Reformateurs' subsequent announcement of theirfirst-ballot support for the eventually successful presidentialcandidacy of Giscard d'Estaing in 1974 abruptly shifted the balance ofpower among the factions of the Right. As with every other party initiative among Giscardians, thefoundation of the UDF was the work of Giscard himself. TheRepublicans remained a party of "notables," persons of local eminence"with long careers in politics based on the strength of their hold onlocal fiefdoms rather than on their youth, expertise, ormodernity."[22] These personalities were organized around thepersonality of Giscard and, as a group, they were drawn from thesocial elite. Wilson, French Politics under the Fifth Republic (NewYork: Praeger, 1982), 165. Shields, "The Politics of Disaffection: France in the198 s," in Political Culture in France and Germany, ed. In his words, The new French democracy will be oriented toward pluralism: Political pluralism, implying a diversity of parties and institutions. In French Democracy, the book hewrote during his presidency, Giscard believed he had found the key toexplaining his approach, and attracting voters, with the notion of"pluralism"--an idea suitable to the higher plane of presidentialcampaigning. But Giscard assigned only 33% of theministerial portfolios to the Gaullists after his election, as heclearly sought to change the government "from a Gaullist one to onemore amenable to his ideas."[18] Giscard wanted to split the Gaullists into pro- and anti-Giscardfactions. The Republicans' generaleconomic views were based on the conviction that a balanced budget,the avoidance of inflation, fiscal restraint, and the stability of thefranc were vital to the economy. Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 199 .________. Bell (New York: St. But the RPR/UDF coalition was alsorevived by the reelection of Mitterand and formed the Union durassemblement at du centre (URC) a "comprehensive electoral agreement"in which single Right candidates were put forward in many locations.The URC performed extremely well and a Socialist landslide wasaverted. French Democracy. The UDF's Giscardism holds that social changes underway inFrance "need to be matched with new political and economic principlesmore appropriate" to the times than the notions of either the Left orthe Right.[8] Basically Giscard sought to temper dearly-heldprinciples of economic liberalism, which seem extreme to some, with areputation (of his own manufacture) for moderate progressivism. But, withthe subsequent elevation of Socialist Lionel Jospin to Prime Ministerfollowing the 1997 elections, the Right may well face, once again, asituation in which only a coalition between the RPR and the UDF willensure another parliamentary or presidential majority. 3d ed. The Gaullist coalition rivalries had helped tobring about the collapse of their majority, but the UDF had alsohelped ensure that the Right had a majority for so many years. Bell, 9-23. A. [7]Frank L. The CNIP had given de Gaulle some support,but when the President forced the referendum on presidential electionsin 1962, the majority of CNIP deputies refused to support him. Vincent Cronin(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), xi-xii.[38]Safran, 79.[39]Joseph A. "The Giscardians and Party Politics." In Contemporary French Political Parties, ed. Chirac began to enhance his ownreputation for mild progressivism, co-opting Giscard's claim to thechange-without-risk label by pointing to the UDF's commitment tolaissez-faire capitalism as far more right-wing than the Gaullists--giving the RPR the right to be considered the more Centrist segment ofthe Right. When, in 1962, the procedure for the election of presidentschanged from the electoral college system to direct election thepolitical process for presidential candidates also changed. The need for an electoral base and a supportivemajority have thus produced a situation in which presidents--who aretheoretically above the political fray, but must, after all, seelegislation enacted and get reelected--are instead deeply involved inthe mechanics of parties, especially in building coalitions andincreasing party membership. The mystique of de Gaulle had faded and the publicseemed to be moving away from his rigid statist positions. The laws on divorce and abortion, subjects with maximumvisibility and significant youth appeal, were also liberalized--another of the "great achievements" Giscard now claims for hispresidency--though the lack of risk involved applied as much to theUDF's interests as it did to those of the nation.[33] Another facet of Giscard's agenda, his opposition to what hecalled De Gaulle's "solitary exercise of power," appears largely tohave been for show--undoubtedly a reasonable choice, being the logicalpoint on which any non-Gaullist Rightist would choose to distinguishhimself from de Gaulle.[34] In practice, once again, Giscard'sposition was very different. But he was easily undermined by the similarities--which grew as his presidency advanced. If all theChirac supporters had voted for Giscard on the second round he wouldhave been reelected. [5]Searls, 15. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977.________. "Fragile Mandate: Party Programmes and Public Expenditures in the French Fifth Republic." European Journal of Political Research 14 (1991): 149-71.Pierce, Roy. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995.Fysh, Peter. "The Politics of Disaffection: France in the 198 s." In Political Culture in France and Germany, ed. [3]G. One of the first acts the new Socialist presidentundertook was to dissolve the National Assembly, and, when the newelections produced "a Socialist landslide," the Right coalition of theRPR and the UDF "after 23 years as the majority, assumed for the firsttime the role of opposition."[9] Thus, from that point until thepresent the UDF and the RPR have avoided campaigning for "any cruderetour en arrière that would systematically undo the reforms of the1981-86 legislature."[1 ] In the face of the Socialists' overwhelming victories, the Rightneeded to regroup. "The Evolution of the Party System, 1974-199 ." In French Political Parties in Transition, ed. This was possiblebecause the UDF's "loose structure and lack of effectiveorganisational discipline encouraged rival potential candidates."[43]From the beginning the federal nature of the UDF, in which each of thethree parties had a voice in every decision and on every committee,had been an excellent means of maintaining the necessary level oforder within the party. The Republicans lacked a "strong grass-roots politicalmachine," as well as the party discipline and interest necessary toestablish such a structure.[23] This state of affairs contrastedstrongly, of course, with Chirac's ability to register voters for theRPR--reaching an enrollment of 7 , by the mid-198 s.[24] On theother hand, there was not so sharp a difference in the two parties'policy positions once Chirac became a neoliberal. N. Butduring his term Giscard faced an ever-growing gap between his share ofthe majority and the RPR 's share, which meant that he needed somemeans of ensuring both parliamentary support and an electoral base forreelection. This group featured numerous internal differences--"distinguished largely by their closeness to or distance fromChirac's Gaullism."[4] In addition, the UDF took in the much smallerMouvement démocrate et socialiste, "a small Centrist grouping."[5]There were also a number of so-called "adhérents directs," who joinedthe UDF without wishing to align themselves with any of its memberparties. In need of electoral andparliamentary support in 1976, Giscard d'Estaing formed the UDF bybringing together his own Republicans in the Parti républicain (thenamed they assumed in 1977) and several other parties. Schlesinger and Mildred Schlesinger, "The Reaffirmation of aMultiparty System in France," American Political Science Review 84(December 199 ): 1 89.[4 ]Ibid.[41]Cole, "Evolution," 8.[42]Evans, 64.[43]Cole, "Evolution," 11.[44]Searls, 18.[45]Cole, "Return," 129.[46]Ibid., 13 .[47]Peter Fysh, "Candidates and Parties of the Right," in Electing theFrench President: The 1995 Presidential Election, ed. In 1981Giscard failed to be reelected to the presidency, and Wilson, in 1982,noted that, with the major exception of Gaullism, few such groups"endure even through the political career of those whose personalitiesfirst created the group and even fewer survive the disappearance ofthe founder."[7] Against these considerable odds, however, the UDF has survived.Yet it is unlikely that so-called Giscardism was responsible for thisoutcome. A presidential candidate must beseen as a representative of the national interest in order to exertbroad enough appeal to survive the two ballots. Economic pluralism, signifying a rejection of monopolies and of state capitalism as well as state socialism. Cultural pluralism, which stands for tolerance, diversified media of opinion and information, and for freedom of creation, expression, and research.[37] As Giscard's premises show, he was intent on the Center--nomatter what lengths he had to go to in order to present the gentlerface of economic liberalism. After the failure of the UDF in the 1988 presidentialelections and the decision not to put forward a candidate in 1995,after Giscard withdrew, the party seemed in danger of becomingirrelevant. Alistair Cole, 1 6-39. "The Reaffirmation of a Multiparty System in France." American Political Science Review 84 (December 199 ): 1 77-11 1.Shields, James G. "L'Union pour la démocratie française." In French Political Parties: A Documentary Guide, ed. Most significantly for the UDF, Barrefailed because he was reduced "to appearing as a 'centre' candidate,rather than as a conservative candidate trying to attract centristpolitical support (which better corresponded to his actualposition)."[45] Barre was largely forced into this position byChirac's candidacy, but also by the need to represent the prevailingCentrist compromise that was the general working arrangement among theUDF's component parts. The origins of the party, and its rather vague stands on policyand programs, go back to 1962 and the formation of the Republicainsindépendents (RI or Republicans). In practice, however, there were only occasionalmoments, such as pushing for direct elections to the Europeanparliament, when Giscard could be distinguished from most Gaullists.He was always "energetic in defending French sovereignty and interest,even at the cost of European unity"--as he demonstrated in defying theEuropean Court in a 1979-198 trade dispute with Britain.[29] Such deGaulle-like moments also occurred in the sphere of alliance-relatedpolicy--as when Giscard impulsively held a two-man summit withBrezhnev during the 198 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The first round of the campaign was so bitterlyfought, as Chirac ran against Giscard, that on the second ballot thevote transfers from Chirac to Giscard were disastrously low. But dissension between the RPR and the UDF continued and thecoalition was never as effective as it had been. A. Giscard was elected UDF president in 1988and made the bold decision to have the UDF stand alone in the Europeanelections of 1994. This was partly due to the return of Giscard. Alistair Cole(Aldershot, England: Dartmouth, 199 ), 121.[29]Wilson, 149.[3 ]Valery Giscard d'Estaing, "Interview," Europe, May 1997, 19.[31]Wilson, 152.[32]Evans, 51.[33]Giscard d'Estaing, "Interview," 19.[34]Quoted in Wilson, 15 .[35]Safran, 77.[36]Ibid., 78.[37]Valery Giscard d'Estaing, French Democracy, trans. Martin's Press, 1992.Wilson, Frank L. Translated by Vincent Cronin. The Right coalition of the RPR and the UDF foundered onChirac's ambition. David S. The challenge from the RPR was clearly directed at thesame segment of the electorate that Giscard hoped to hold or gain:"shopkeepers, farmers, free professionals, middle- and upper-echelonwhite-collar employees, and pensioners."[35] Throughout 1976 and 1977Chirac and the RPR were developing their case against the Republicansas a matter of contrast between the true populism of the Gaullists andthe elitist makeup of the RI--a party that had never elicited anyserious working-class support. Alistair Cole, 3-24. This strategy wasimportant up to 1981, but following Mitterand's election it becameessential. . He had also hoped toincorporate Chirac's group into the RI, or at least consolidate it'sallegiance to him in some definite manner. With theelimination of Barre as a presidential possibility, and the defeat ofChirac, Giscard benefited from having failed to be entered as the UDFcandidate in 1988. Mitterand's enormous success in positioninghimself as a president for all France showed, however, that a Centerposition was viable only if it was used by one of the dominant polesto widen support--especially in presidential elections. (New York: Longman, 1991),8 .[21]Stevens, 23 .[22]Wilson, 153.[23]Ibid., 146.[24]Safran, 8 .[25]Pierce, 461.[26]Wilson, 148.[27]Ibid., 149.[28]Alistair Cole, "The Return of the Orleanist Right: The Union for FrenchDemocracy," in French Political Parties in Transition, ed. [6]Ibid., 15. Certainly whatever differenceshe had with the pre-RPR Gaullists, even in the areas where he saw thestrongest divergence, "turned out to be less in practice," than theyhad been in campaigning.[26] Giscard's commitment to economic liberalism was definitelyopposed to the more interventionist leanings of the Gaullists under deGaulle. Thus, though the Socialists benefited from adegree of disunity, as voters perceived Mitterand's distance fromCommunist positions, "the disunity of the Right secured Mitterand'svictory."[41] After the defeat the UDF's survival was improbable since Giscardwithdrew from politics for a time and, throughout the 198 s, theambitions of various UDF leaders had an extremely disruptive effect.Though the UDF continued to do fairly well in parliamentary elections,the 198 s saw the party leaders focused primarily on the 1988election. Chirac's 1995 election seemed to confirm this. Addinall, 47- 66. [4]Ibid., 48. rightists dividedtheir allegiances," with less than half claiming the RPR and less thana third loyal to the UDF.[13] Thus, in its first 1 years ofexistence, and despite Giscard's loss in the 1981 elections, the UDFhad assured itself a place in French politics by virtue of being theonly means by which the Gaullists could regain their majority--shortof actually absorbing the UDF. . He therefore initiated andpushed through a very moderate, but high-profile, program of socialreforms commensurate with his second-round election slogan,"changement sans risque."[32] The voting age was lowered to 18, thestate-run broadcast media systems were reformed, a small capital gainstax was initiated, and, by executive action, Giscard established aministerial portfolio for women's affairs and increased governmentresponsibility for the environmental impact of public works andhousing. Giscard nowlists acceptance of the direct vote for the European parliament andhaving "helped create the European Monetary system [as] the forerunnerof the monetary union" among the "great achievements" of hispresidency.[3 ] But his pro-European stance at the time merelyfollowed "trends discernible during" Pompidou's administration andeven detectable as far back as the end of De Gaulle's last term.[31] Giscard, believed that his narrow margin of victory in 1974 (andthe first-ballot defeat of Chaban-Delmas that enabled it) was due to afairly widespread desire for reforms. Yet, at the sametime, a presidential candidate also needs an electoral base, andalmost anyone running for president will have spent his or her careeras a representative of a political party. But Barre failed at the voting booths, securing only 16.5%of the first-round votes. Instead ofdeveloping "formalised rules governing leadership selection andinternal democracy," the UDF has ""depended on--usually reveled in--the delights and poisons of factionalism, patronage, and personalrivalry."[49] But this problem of cadre-like behavior also extends tothe RPR which fielded two serious candidates for the presidency in1995. Evans, "L'Union pour la démocratie française," in FrenchPolitical Parties: A Documentary Guide, ed. Rather than a party in a traditionalsense, the UDF is a coalition of small parties whose principal sharedcharacteristic is membership in the non-Gaullist Right. Robert Elgie (London:Macmillan, 1996), 76-77.[48]Evans, 65.[49]Fysh, 9 . Robert Elgie, 73-95. The Government and Politics of France. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.