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U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN PERSIAN GULF WAR.   Term Paper ID:26613 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Analyzes foreign policy decisions, diplomacy & military events leading up to, during & after 1990-91 war between Western allies & Iraq.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Analyzes foreign policy decisions, diplomacy & military events leading up to, during & after 1990-91 war between Western allies & Iraq. Paper Introduction: US INVOLVEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (1990-1991) This research paper summarizes and analyzes the United States foreign policy decisions and military events which led to, perpetuated and ended American involvement in the Persian Gulf War, including the military strategy employed by Iraq and the United States during that war. The Persian Gulf War was precipitated by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990 and the determination by the United States that its vital interests were thereby threatened. American foreign policy, because it sought to maintain a balance between Iraqi and Iranian power in the region, sent Iraq mixed signals which failed to deter the invasion, but many other factors lay behind Saddam Hussein's decision to invade. Thereafter, the United States effectively built up its forces in Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. The desert was an ideal milieu for employment of Allied armored andair forces. George. Iraq's military strategy was defensive during thisperiod, and largely ineffective. He exploited a long dispute over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, which originally was drawn up by the British in 1922. The Americans planned for and carriedout a war in which, said Gordon and Trainor, "one side had a clear pictureof events while the other floundered deaf, dumb, and blind" (x). On August 2, Hiroreported that Bush said "with this [Kuwait's oil] Iraq would be able tomanipulate oil prices and hold the United States and its allies at itsmercy" (1 8). . Friedman said "thefortification of Kuwait generally followed the pattern developed during theIran-Iraq War, consisting of a fairly deep barrier backed by artillery andmobile reserves" (113). Thiswould have greatly complicated the Western task of rallying opinion to itsside. New York: Interlink Publishing. (1993). military to destroy or conquer Iraq, but one reason he supported amassive air campaign was that he wished to cripple Baghdad's ability todominate its neighbors through its possession of weapons of massdestruction. War Termination Powell's Doctrine called for decisive victory and then, accordingGordon and Trainor, "American forces would be quickly withdrawn so as notto become entangled in the war's messy aftermath" (469). Through diplomatic intermediaries Bush also made it clearto Hussein that if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons, the UnitedStates would respond massively in kind. But he and others doubted that air power alone won the war. At meetings at Camp David on August 4-5, 199 Bush was toldby his top military advisers that: 2 , -25 , troops would be neededto defend Saudi Arabia; it would take at least four months to deploy themthere; about double that force would be needed to eject the Iraqis fromKuwait; and double that time would be needed to deploy them. He largely delegated the implementation of warfighting to thearmed services. US INVOLVEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR (199 -1991) This research paper summarizes and analyzes the United States foreignpolicy decisions and military events which led to, perpetuated and endedAmerican involvement in the Persian Gulf War, including the militarystrategy employed by Iraq and the United States during that war. In 1989-199 , he turned on his Arab benefactors, SaudiArabia, Kuwait and the other Gulf states. but will be reluctant to engage in foreign militaryadventures" (Gordon and Trainor 1 ). American diplomacy prepared international and domestic public opinionfor the eventuality of war. The United States offered Iraq few, if any,incentives to back down. The Soviet Union becameIraq's chief arms supplier in 1972. These efforts were aided by theending of the Cold War because, as Hiro noted, "Moscow could not veto anyanti-Iraq resolutions of the UN Security Council" nor could it any longerdefy world opinion by arming Iraq (165). Background to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 199 During the 196 s and 197 s, relations, formally broken in 1967,between the United States and Iraq were poor. (1991). Craig, Gordon A., and Alexander L. Shultz, George P. Thereafter, Iraq might havewithdrawn, holding onto pieces of Kuwait along the disputed border. Boston:Little, Brown. Iraqi military strategy between August 199 and January 1991 was toreinforce its troops in Kuwait and dig in. The Americans succeeded in convincing King Fahd that the Iraqis poseda real military threat to Saudi Arabia that justified his taking theinternal risks involved in inviting a large infidel host into Saudi Arabia. The attack inthe western desert was accompanied by a direct assault on Kuwait city'sdefenses led by American marines and a feint toward an amphibious landing.The Iraqis stood little chance of success against the high tech weaponryand superbly trained and led Allied force, which achieved all of itsobjectives in four days and suffered only 613 casualties (Gordon andTrainor 457). Iraqistrategy, foreign policy and military, was a debacle from start to finish. (1993). Desert Shield and Desert Storm The Second GulfWar. These mixed signals violated the first rule of aneffective policy of deterrence, which Craig and George said was that anythreat to an opponent must be "credible and sufficiently potent in the eyesof the aggressor to prevent him from attempting the undesired course ofaction" (19 ). The keyconcepts were: "superior training, superior command and control andsuperior logistics" (Friedman 243). According to Friedman, herenewed these demands in the summer of 199 , and asserted that "Kuwait wasillegally poaching on the Iraqi side of the border" by pumping oil from it(11). Hiro, Dilip. There were three elements: militaryobjectives, strategic concepts and resource deployment.Bush decided the overall national security objective: the liberation ofKuwait and the ejection of Iraqi forces therefrom. At a final Iraqi-Kuwaiti meeting on July 31, 199 , Iraq demandedthat Kuwait pay it $1 billion in cash "plus some territory and oildrilling rights" (Friedman 33). (1992). As, however, the tide of battle shifted in favor of the Iranians after mid-1982, American Secretary of State George Shultz said: "our support for Iraqincreased in rough proportion to Iran's military successes" (237). They came after the United States had turned a blind eye toa series of Iraqi actions which some in the administration and in theSenate viewed as hostile. The evidence is mixed as to whether Hussein intended to invade SaudiArabia. The United States is back to pursuing an expensiveand frustrating dual containment policy against both Iran and Iraq. Some senior White House advisers referred to this as the "nightmarescenario" (Hiro 3 1). Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Boston: Northeastern U P. The administration of George Bushdismissed these moves as saber-rattling. Moving the Allied force into place and maintaining it for months was agigantic logistic enterprise. Arming Iraq. Until the Khomeini revolution in 1979,the United States relied on the Shah of Iran as a bulwark of stability inthe central Middle East. bases on Saudi soil" (Hiro 11 ). According to Hiro, Iraq's original invasionof Kuwait which was conducted by six divisions of the elite RepublicanGuard and supporting special forces and air attacks "was considered wellplanned and efficiently implemented" (1 3). The war was terminated in a manner which left Husseinin power and a thorn in the Americans' side. Works Cited Atkinson, Rick. . Hussein, who had used chemicalweapons against the Iranians and Iraq's Kurds in 1988, did not use them inthe Gulf War. Hussein's rigid structure and diplomatically intransigentleadership made in many respects for an ideal enemy, easy to demonize andto outmaneuver diplomatically and militarily. He did not tell theU.S. From Desert Shield toDesert Storm. Hussein, however, had shown in thepast a willingness to take huge risks to consolidate his domestic position,such as by attacking more populous Iran when Khomeini's minions stirred upIraq's Shiites. (1991). (1997). The policy of the United States, which fearedthe spread of Iranian-backed Muslim fundamentalism, was expressed inNational Security Council Directive, NSD-26 of October 3, 1989: "normalrelations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-terminterests and promote stability in both the gulf and the Middle East"(Pythian 42). By seizing Kuwait, which had 1 percent of theworld's proven reserves, Iraq doubled its share to 2 percent. Hussein apparentlybelieved that the American public would not tolerate heavy Americancasualties. Bennis, Phyllis, and Michael Moushabeck (Eds.). Under the 1979 Carter Doctrine the United States identified the Gulfregion as a vital American interest. Friedmanconceded that the air campaign "was stunningly successful" and resulted inthe loss of only 4 Allied planes in the course of over 5 , sorties (164and 167). When Iraq launched an armored attack on the Saudi bordervillage of Khafji on January 29, 1991, Iraqi not Allied forces sufferedheavy casualties. (1992). New York: Scribner's. An important dividend of American coalition diplomacy was that theAllies plus the Japanese and others eventually defrayed roughly 9 percent($54 billion) of the cost of the war (Atkinson 493). The United States made effective use of the United NationsSecurity Council, which passed resolutions condemning Iraq's actions inKuwait and imposed economic sanctions. Crusade The Untold Story of the Persian GulfWar. Under the governing AirLand concept, combined arms, air, land andnaval forces were to be used to achieve a decisive victory. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Iraqi plansassumed that Allied attacks would come from the sea or along the roads andnot through the open desert. Friedman, Norman. At a series of meetings among the leaders of Arab countries in early199 , Hussein demanded that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lower their oilproduction and that all the Gulf states cancelIraq's war debts to them. The Allies even did abetter job of keeping their troops supplied with water, a critical elementin desert-fighting, than did the Iraqis. Conclusion In its waffling pre-Kuwait invasion stance and by its prematuretermination of the Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration allowed itspenchant for balancing Iraqi and Iranian power to interfere with soundforeign policy and military judgements. Iraq's ability to repay was hampered bydeclining world oil prices. The key was complete Allied air andartillery superiority over the battlefield which pinned down the Iraqis,disrupted their communications and prevented reinforcements from arriving. Desert Victory The War For Kuwait.Annapolis: Naval Institute P. In between, diplomacy and militarystrategy wereemployed with great success to achieve the desired objectives. Bush supported aquick ending to the war so as to avoid public perceptions that the Allieswere piling on and causing unnecessary casualties. At a White House meeting on October 5, 199 Bushtold Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell that he favored the use offorce over sanctions: "I do not think there's the political time for thatstrategy" (Hiro 225). The results of the Persian Gulf War were,therefore, incomplete. TheUnited States provided Iraq with valuable diplomatic, economic andintelligence assistance. The Iraqis had a rigid command and controlstructure, which resulted from Hussein's insistence on maintainingpolitical as well as military control over his forces. A strategic debate developed early in the American planning for thewar between advocates of the unrestricted use of airpower and others, suchas Powell, who supported the massive 39 day air campaign, which featuredthe use of high tech weaponry such as F-117 stealth bombers, cruisemissiles and advanced electronic radar jamming and surveillance systems toknock out Iraq's air defenses, air forces and support facilities,centralized command and control structure and its industrial, military andsupporting civilian infrastructure, but who also insisted that a groundcampaign was necessary to liberate Kuwait. From a minimal air and sea presence inAugust, by January 15, the Allied force reached 58 , troops, 1,14 aircraft, 3,5 tanks and 64 warships (Dunnigan and Bay 251). New York: Oxford U P. What is clear, as Atkinson said, is "the House of Saud wasunlikely to survive in a Persian Gulf dominated by Saddam Hussein" (53).Hussein's assurances to the contrary were disbelieved because Iraq'scredibility on that subject was gone. (199 ). By January, the Pentagon estimated there were53 , Iraqi troops in Kuwait together with 4,3 tanks, 2,7 armoredpersonnel carriers and 3, artillery pieces (Friedman 119). According to Brzezinski et al., "during the 198 s, the United Statesstrove to maintain a de facto balance of power between Iraq and Iran sothat neither would be able to achieve a regional hegemony that mightthreaten American interests" (22). Friedman said"given the primitive command and control arrangements, the guns could notreact quickly to engage a fast-moving force" (117). (1995). Thatline was unpopular with Iraqi nationalists because it left Iraq with nodeep water port on the open sea. In 1989, Hussein reasserted a claim madeby the Iraqi government in 196 -1 that Kuwait was part of Iraq and demandeda lease of the offshore Kuwaiti Bubayan island. Pythian, Mark. American Ambassador to Iraq AprilGlaspie told Hussein on July 25, 199 : "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arabconflicts, like your border disagreements with Kuwait" (Bennis andMoushabeck 395). Pre-Gulf War Military Buildup and Diplomacy It is remarkable that Hussein apparently did not foresee that Iraq'sseizure of Kuwait would trigger massive Allied military intervention in theGulf. New York: Routledge. "Dual Containment Is More a Slogan Than a Policy." Foreign Affairs76: 19-3 . American military strategy, whichultimately prevailed decisively, was to apply overwhelming conventionalforce through the use of strategic and tactical air power, and animaginative ground campaign which capitalized on Allied strengths and Iraqimilitary weaknesses. American foreign policy, becauseit sought to maintain a balance between Iraqi and Iranian power in theregion, sent Iraq mixed signals which failed to deter the invasion, butmany other factors lay behind Saddam Hussein's decision to invade.Thereafter, the United States effectively built up its forces in the Gulf.It developed and held together a coalition of European and Arab nations tofight the war and to secure international and domestic support for itsobjectives, which were to liberate Kuwait and destroy Iraq's militarycapacity to threaten Western access to the oil reserves of the region andmoderate Arab regimes. He was told"there was no alternative to having U.S. Dunnigan, James F., and Austin Bay. (May/June1997). Thefinishing touches were supplied by a devastating Allied armored attackacross the Iraqi western border which caught the Iraqis completely bysurprise and ended with the wholesale destruction of Iraqis forces fleeingnorth from Kuwait on the Highway of Death in mid-February. American diplomacyalso succeeded in keeping Israel from entering the war, despite Iraq's Scudmissile attacks on Israeli cities, which was necessary to avoid Arabdefections from the coalition. American relations with Irandeteriorated during the Iranian hostage crisis; however, the United Statesremained neutral during the first two years of the 198 -1987 Iran-Iraq war. Theoperation strained Allied air and sealift capacity. After the Iran-Iraq war ended, Iraq found itself saddled with amassive war debt of nearly $1 billion, about half to non-Arab armssuppliers and the rest to its Arab Gulf neighbors, including $14 billionowed to Kuwait (Hiro 42). Allied Military Equation. Beyond theStorm A Gulf Crisis Reader. The Allies stood aside while Husseinsuppressed the Shiite revolt in the south and the Kurds in the north.Hussein, therefore, remains in power and a thorn in the side of theAmericans and the world. American satellite photographs alerted United States intelligence toIraq's buildup of forces north of the Kuwaiti border which reached over1 , troops by late July 199 . A 1989 CIA National Intelligence Estimateopined: "war weary Iraq will pose a military threat to small neighboringstates . The other aim of American diplomacy was the welding of an effectivemulti-national coalition. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy. New York: Morrow. That task, which included twenty eight nations,fifteen of whom provided military assistance, was a very complexenterprise. Public opinion polls in the United States in thefall showed that support for military action was razor thin and declining.Congress eventually approved military action by a relatively small margin.Internationally, Hiro said "the chief reason for not considering theembargo option seriously was the fragility of the anti-Iraq coalition"(229). Trainor said "before the groundwar was launched, the bulk of the Iraqi army was all but broken by poormorale and the unrelenting assault of allied airpower" (151). Force andStatecraft. Military Strategy of Iraq and the United States Iraqi Military Strategy. The Persian Gulf War was precipitated by the invasion of Kuwait byIraq in August 199 and the determination by the United States that itsvital interests were thereby threatened. TheGeneral's War The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Trainor. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretaryof State. Exclusive of Iran, it contained 655.5billion barrels of the world's 1, 12 billion barrels of proven crude oilreserves (Hiro 43 ). Hiro said"the armed action [of the Allied coalition] had less to do with therecovery of Kuwait's sovereignty than with ensuring supplies of cheap oiland continued influence of the West in the Gulf" (44 ). Their frontline troops and communications were tornapart by Allied air and artillery. Fundamentally, he andhis advisers did not wish Iraq to become so destabilized that Khomeini'sIran would dominate the region. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.