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Truman's Containment Policy   Term Paper ID:27367 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Discusses the development of Truman's policy of containment toward the Soviet Union in the early post-war period. Focuses on Henry Kissinger's review of the situation & accuses the policy in general & Kissinger in particular of evil deeds.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Discusses the development of Truman's policy of containment toward the Soviet Union in the early post-war period. Focuses on Henry Kissinger's review of the situation & accuses the policy in general & Kissinger in particular of evil deeds. Paper Introduction: Henry Kissinger (1994), in his book, Diplomacy described President Harry Truman's policy toward NATO and the Warsaw Pact as "Containment" (424). Truman favored American membership in a European Coalition to be called NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in order to stop the spread of Russian Communism into western Europe under the Warsaw Pact (formed in 1955). His policy was a radical departure from Franklin Delano Roosevelt's concept of "Four Policemen" which would have monitored relations in Europe (Kissinger, 1994, 424). Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann (1994) also sing the praises of the Truman Doctrine in their book, The United States and the New Europe: 19451993. Like Kissinger, these authors believe the Truman Doctrine was a magnificent, visionary, foreign policy initiative which utilized a minimum of military resources, coupled with massive economic aid, to resist the spread of Co Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Duignan and Gann admit that the formation of NATO did hit some snags,such as the issue of German rearmament, but they state that the overallbenefits outweighed any negatives. Additionally, the administration hoped tofoster a constant flow of investment and expertise between Europe and theUnited States: thus insuring a US dominated and secure economic market forAmerican products and European ingenuity: The Marshall Plan, like NATO, created an intricate network of intra- European and transatlantic contacts among businessmen, civil servants, and trade unionists. Kissinger believes one cannot overstate theimportance of the timing of this announcement in contributing to thegrowing mistrust and misunderstandings between the United States and Russiaat this time. Marshall, which called for the United States to give massive economicaid to the nations of Europe who were committed to rebuilding withdemocratic governments at the head of their societies. Peter Duignan and L.H. He argues that Stalin already knew of America's work on theAtomic bomb and took it for granted that Truman was aware of this fact.Thus, he viewed Truman's revelation as a bald attempt to intimidate Russiainto subservience to the United States and its policies (Kissinger, 1994,439). . Churchill's "Iron Curtain" had descendedupon Eastern Europe as the Soviet Union set up puppet regimes in Poland,East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria(Duignan and Gann, 1994, 35). It was against a backdrop of these obstacles that the Trumanadministration devised the brilliant, double-edged, strategy of theMarshall Plan coupled with the NATO security alliance. These documents caught the eye of the Truman administration and whereincorporated into a two pronged policy designed to stop Soviet expansion.The first initiative consisted of the "Marshall Plan," proposed by GeorgeC. The calledthe plan "a new welfare capitalism - confidant, committed to raisingproductivity, raising wages, expanding markets, and establishing good laborrelations by depoliticizing trade unions" (Duignan and Gann, 1994, 41).The authors little but praise for the plan which they also credit withanticipating modern Europe's trade commissions and economic pacts, thelowering of tariffs and protective economic policies, and introducingConstitutional reforms in Germany and Italy. Like Kissinger, Duignanand Gann point out that Stalin's speeches and policies reinforced thenotion that there were two camps, one Communist and one Capitalist, and thelaws of nature stated that the two camps would always be diametricallyopposed (Duignan, 1994, 37). They note that at the end of World War II, the Truman administrationwas casting about for a means of maintaining only a nominal presence inEurope while not creating a power vacuum in which the Soviet Union couldexpand and eventually cause another great war. In these articles, Kennan argued that Stalinwas merely another leader in a long line of Russian rulers (dating back tothe Czars) who envisioned Russia expansion westward. Instead, they insisted that a much more active stanceagainst Soviet aggression was needed because they argued that nation wasgrowing stronger and pursuing more and more aggressive, expansionistpolicies (Kissinger, 1994, 464). They agreed with Kissinger that NATOtightened links between the US and the new Europe and argued that NATO hada positive influence on nations to take their first steps toward democraticgovernments (as in the case of the Portuguese coup of 1974 by militaryofficers with NATO experience) (Duignan and Gann, 1994, 44). For, once America's confidence in his good faith had been destroyed, there was no easy road back for him. Duignan and Gann (1994) agree with Kissinger that the US initially wasreluctant in proposing the NATO alliance. At the same time the Soviet Union showed awillingness to meddle beyond the Curtain by attempting to supportCommunists in the bloody civil war in Greece as well as support Communistagitation in France and Italy (Duignan, 1994, 36). The result was the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, and the Western military buildup, none of which could have been his game plan (Kissinger, 1994, 444). He unfairly casts theUnited States as "white knights" pursuing the noble causes of freedom anddemocracy and at no time does he admit that the US also could have theulterior motives of spreading their influence over Europe. Atthe war's conclusion, the American people clamored for the return of theirsons, daughters, husbands, and wives: The result was a massive and rapiddemobilization of the American military. They also argue that thisalliance was formed out of the necessity of countering Soviet aggression.They note the alliance policy widely gained acceptance after the Communisttakeover of Prague and the initiation of the Berlin blockade of 1948, aswell as the invasion of South Korea which was widely believed to have beensupported by the Soviet Union (Duignan and Gann, 1994, 42). It also ignores the often bittertariff battles between the European nations and between these nations andthe United States. Duignan and Gann(1994) argue that the goal of Truman's NATO and Marshall policies was tofoster unity among the historically fractious nations of Europe. At its height, Americahad some 12,5 , men and women under arms during the war; most of whomwere connected to the European theater (Duignan and Gann, 1994, 38). Kennan.One of these documents became known as "the Long Telegram" while the otherappeared in a July 1947 edition of the periodical Foreign Affairs(Kissinger, 1994, 447 & 454). Stalin also warnedthe Russian people that war with the United States was inevitable(Kissinger, 1994, 44 ). Nevertheless, it is troubling that both books oversimplify theCold War as a battle between the purely altruistic and noble US and thepurely evil Soviet Union. The armed forces of bothour allies and former enemies remained in weakened states or in shambles.These minimal forces were left to face a hostile Soviet military consistingof five million men organized into 175 divisions. The distinction was important to theTruman administration because they felt that NATO would not oppose anychanges or reforms instituted in Europe as long as they were imposedthrough the democratic process rather than force. He had no use for America's attempts tobase diplomacy on principles such as free elections. His policy was a radical departure from Franklin DelanoRoosevelt's concept of "Four Policemen" which would have monitoredrelations in Europe (Kissinger, 1994, 424). This Atlantic Alliance would eventually be called theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization. Duignan and Gann allow themselves to be carried away in their analysisof the success of the Truman Doctrine. Kissinger concludes his analysis of the Potsdam conference and itsimplications for US /Russian relations by stating: The practical result of Potsdam was the beginning of the process that divided Europe into two spheres of influence, the very scenario America's wartime [World War II as opposed to Cold War] leaders had been most determined to avoid. Like Kissinger, they arguethat, "when World War II ended, there was little commitment to continuedAmerican military presence in Europe (Duignan, 1994, 42). Theystated that the Marshall Plan predicated the European Union which willdominate Europe at the end of this century (Duignan, 1994, 41). Kissinger notes that NATO wasAmerica's first attempt at a peacetime military alliance in its history andwrote: "The Marshall Plan was designed to get Europe on its feeteconomically. Although Truman had not fully given up on Roosevelt's proposal ofthe "Four Policeman" in which the United States, Great Britain, Russia, andFrance would jointly control foreign policy in Europe, he increasinglybecame alarmed by speeches from Stalin warning that there was littledifference between Nazi Germany and Russia's wartime allies because theywere all rabid capitalists bent on destroying Russia. All this, they note, withouta major scandal and at a cost of $17 billion ($12 billion at today'svalues) which they consider a bargain by today's standards (Duignan andGann, 1994, 41). Gann (1994). Beside the obvious restrictions due tologistics and cost, Duignan and Gann (1994) describe the isolationistsentiment which was once again sweeping the nation. Furthermore, hewanted the remaining German industrial resources, which were located inUnited States' and Great Britain's zones of control, to be utilized forproducing those reparations (Kissinger, 1994, 434). Peter Duignan and L.H. Kennan advocated a policyof containment through a coalition of the armed forces of Western Europe'sdemocracies. However, Duignan and Gann feel NATO's greatest contributions includehanding the US and European nations new experience's in forming complexalliances and working organizations for resolving disputes and fosteringcooperation (Duignan, 1994, 44). Henry Kissinger (1994), in his book, Diplomacy described PresidentHarry Truman's policy toward NATO and the Warsaw Pact as "Containment"(424). By the end of his [Truman's] first term, however, every vestige of wartime harmony had vanished. They argue that the policiesdepoliticized European trade unions but this portrays almost shockingignorance of the post war political power and influence behind bothFrance's and Germany's trade unions. Duignan and Gann declare the Truman Doctrine a stunning success. Both books lionize Truman and the American policymakers whiledemonizing Stalin's regime and the Soviet Union. The Truman administration insisted that the new alliance was unlikeanything in history because it advocated a balance of principles such asfreedom and democracy, rather than a balance of power in which territory isdefended (Kissinger, 1994, 458). And it is impossible to argue thatthe Truman Doctrine, initiated 5 years ago, has been an unqualifiedsuccess. Gann (1994), in their book, The United Statesand the New Europe: 1945-1993, agreed with Kissinger that NATO was anAmerican response to growing Soviet aggression balanced with America'sdesire to demobilize its massive military machine at the end of World WarII. Kissinger believed the seeds of NATO's development were sewn in thefailures of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 (Kissinger, 1994,434). Since the Truman Doctrineproved ultimately successful 4 years after its inception, it is perhapsunderstandable that an old Cold War soldier such as Kissinger would heappraise on this Doctrine without questioning any US motives. Kissinger concludes by stating the bluff and bluster Stalin used asforeign policy, as well as the very real effort to set up undemocraticsatellite governments in Eastern Europe, forced Truman to adopt a moreaggressive policy against the Soviet Union in Europe as well as sign on tothe plan for a coalition of democratic nations later called NATO: If Stalin was serious, the master calculator had miscalculated. However, the authors successfully describe the conditions which wouldnot allow the Truman administration to maintain a massive, long termmilitary presence in Europe. Yet Duignan and Gann (1994) both believe the United States had amplereason to fear Soviet aggression. Deepening Stalin's mistrust of American motives was the fact thatshortly after the breakdown of negotiations of these issues at Potsdam,Truman pulled him aside and announced that America had developed the AtomicBomb (Kissinger, 1994, 435). . Kissinger notes that the Truman administration went to great lengthsto differentiate between NATO and the old "Balance of Power" doctrine whichhad failed to keep Europe from falling into another great war after WorldWar I. Kissinger onlyholds the US to task for not adopting Churchill's policy of no appeasementwhere Russia was concerned (Kissinger, 1994, 436 & 456). One million men of thisforce were deployed in Eastern Europe facing the west (Duignan, 1994, 38). Even today, there are serious questions as to whetherthe EU's efforts toward economic unification at the turn of the centurywill not fall apart. What was so uniqueabout the Marshall plan was the fact that its aid would be offered toformer enemies such as the new German federal state (built out of Germanterritory occupied by France, Great Britain, and the United States). In this position, Kissinger was responsible forencouraging the Nixon policy of carrying out a "secret war" of massivebombing raids and invasions of Laos and Cambodia while covering this factup and lying to the American people that our forces were reducing theirroles in Asia. Like Kissinger, theseauthors believe the Truman Doctrine was a magnificent, visionary, foreignpolicy initiative which utilized a minimum of military resources, coupledwith massive economic aid, to resist the spread of Communism across WesternEurope. Thesecond prong of the new policy was a military alliance capable ofprojecting overwhelming firepower and thus maintaining the security ofdemocratic Europe. American policy toward the Soviet Union was slowly developed in thelate 194 s along the basis of two documents written by George F. This question certainly existed at the time ofpublication of their work as English voters rejected many Mastricht Treatystipulations. He supports this belief by pointing out that as a senator Trumanhad rated the two dictatorships in Germany and Russia as morally equivalentand that the United States should only support one or the other in order toencourage them to continue destroying each other (Kissinger, 1994, 425). This proposal wasflatly rejected by the US and England. For example, he argues that Stalin continued to make bellicosespeeches to cover up for the fact that a great majority of his nation hadbeen devastated by the Nazi invasion and had left 2 million people dead,thus leaving his nation in a weak negotiating position on the world stage.At no time does Kissinger acknowledge the possibility of a Soviet Unionhorrified by devastating wartime losses and determined to never suffer fromnon-communist aggression again. Gann(1994) also sing the praises of the Truman Doctrine in their book, TheUnited States and the New Europe: 1945-1993. The United States and the NewEurope: 1945-1993. New York: Simon and Schuster. This policy was also pursued under the same doctrine ofcontaining or destroying "Communist expansion and aggression." References Duignan, P. Kissinger believes that these reckless statementsby Stalin were initially efforts to place himself in a strong position forthe next round of negotiations as well as an attempt to keep the Russianpeople focused on issues outside of those regarding a repressive regime. Diplomacy. Kissinger quotes Kennan: The way to defeat Soviet strategy was by a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world (Kissinger, 1994, 455). (1994). The authors all laud America's decisive efforts to counter Sovietaggression. More importantly, NATO proved to be morethan just a military alliance by providing an outlet for politicalactivities and a forum for discussions among member nations: NATO was, above all, more than a military alliance. Nor does he acknowledge the horror, fear,and mistrust the Soviet Union should naturally hold toward a nation capableof developing and willing to use atomic bombs (the United States is theonly nation ever to use such a devise against another nation's population). The United States and the Soviet Union, the two giants at the periphery, were now facing off against one another in the very heart of Europe (Kissinger, 1994, 424 & 436). Kissinger, H. Both books were written in the heady days after the collapse of boththe Berlin wall and the Soviet Union. Duignan andGann spend more time describing the organization of NATO and its intendedand unanticipated benefits while Kissinger primarily focuses on thepolicies which undergirded NATO's development. and L.H. Duignan and Gann report that by1949, the US had barely two divisions in all of Europe and these comprisedof light forces trained for constabulary duties. Stalin demanded $2 billion worth of war reparations (half of whichwere to go to Russia) and a free hand in developing Communist parties orregimes in Russian dominated Eastern and Central Europe. It developed an extensive system of committees dealing with subjects as varied as political collaboration; the settlement of intra-alliance disputes; consultation on foreign policy; economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural cooperation (Duignan, 1994, 45). TheTruman administration believed by encouraging an intertwining of thevarious democratic European nation's military policies as well as economicand social policies (with strong US assistance), they could develop acoalition strong enough to resist Soviet expansion while keeping Americanmilitary presence to a minimum. Kennan's articles arethe origins of the policy of viewing the Soviet Union as an evil empirewhose sole purpose was conquest and expansion. It is interesting to note that while Kissinger does an adequate job ofrelating the issues which created an atmosphere of mistrust andconfrontation among the future partners of NATO against Russia and itsWarsaw Pact allies, he completely slants blame toward the Russians ascynics bent on building an empire at all costs. Truman favored American membership in a European Coalition to becalled NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in order to stop thespread of Russian Communism into western Europe under the Warsaw Pact(formed in 1955). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. Instead, these nations demanded theinternationalization of the Danube river, free elections throughout EasternEurope, and the containment of Poland's western border within itstraditional boundaries rather than with newly acquired German territory.This proposal was rejected by Stalin who Kissinger argues believeddiplomacy was merely a means of collecting, trading, or consolidatingterritory (Kissinger, 1994, 427). Kissinger argues thatthe administration clung to this distinction, despite the fact that NATO'sbottom-line goal was containment of Soviet territorial expansion (and wasclearly understood as such by America's European allies), as a means ofavoiding America's return to traditional isolationist policies bycommitting America to defending its principles of freedom throughout theworld through the NATO vehicle (Kissinger, 1994, 459). He writes: Stalin was re-establishing a policy of confrontation with the West because he understood that the Communist Party he had shaped could not sustain itself in an international or domestic environment dedicated to peaceful coexistence (Kissinger, 1994, 441). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was to lookafter its security" (Kissinger, 1994, 458). Kissinger hypothesizes that Truman was much more willing to pursue aconfrontational set of policies in regard to Russia than Roosevelt becausehe lacked the emotional, close ties to Russia's leader, Stalin, whichRoosevelt had developed throughout the war (Kissinger, 1994, 425). Above all, the Marshall Plan was designed to push Europeans toward political and economic cooperation - a major objective of US policymakers (Duignan and Gann, 1994, 4 ). In the months following the end of World War II, stalled negotiations,and Russia's consolidation of power in Eastern Europe made it obvious thatdreams of continued allied cooperation in the post war era were quicklydying. Duignan and Gann (1994) describe the dilemmas faced byAmerican policy makers in similar terms to those described by Kissinger.They note that US alarm over Soviet expansion was coupled with a knowledgethat isolationist policies on the part of America after World War I hadcreated a dangerous power vacuum in Europe which had contributed to therise of dictatorial governments such as those seen in Germany and Italy aswell as the rise of the Communists in Russia. Heargues that this fact made Truman less committed to appeasement of wartimeallies. Kissinger alsosupports his argument by pointing out that Truman administration officialsrejected the one point of Kennan's articles in which he argued that theSoviet Union was in a state of slow decay and would eventually collapse ofits own volition. This is especially true of the Kissinger book.Kissinger had important ulterior motives in lauding the Truman Doctrine.It was the justification for containment policies continued by him inVietnam and Southeast Asia as Secretary of State under the NixonAdministration. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.