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OPERATION BARBAROSSA.   Term Paper ID:28439 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Impact of Hitler's decision to invade & dominate Slavic Russia. June 1941 invasion of Soviet Unioin as a blunder based on racist ideological position.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Impact of Hitler's decision to invade & dominate Slavic Russia. June 1941 invasion of Soviet Unioin as a blunder based on racist ideological position. Paper Introduction: The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 has often been described as "the greatest blunder of the Second World War" and historians have long debated the relative contributions of ideology and strategy to Hitler's decision to implement Operation Barbarossa, as the invasion was known, at this particular time (Rich 204). Although the notion of lebensraum, the acquisition of 'living room' for the expansion of the Aryan peoples, had long been a major factor in Hitler's plans for the Eastern front his planning had also included a commitment to avoid involving Germany in a two-front war. Despite the inevitability of fighting on two fronts because of the unexpected continuing strength of Britain and the United States' entry into the war, however, Hitler believed that Barbarossa was necessary in practical terms. While he certainly held that it was necessary Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. The problems of history -- from ancient times up to thedisgraceful terms of the Treaty of Versailles -- had been caused by theweakening of the cultural dominance of the Aryan peoples either throughtheir own omissions or the active efforts of the culture-destroying groups. Some,for example, claim that lebensraum in the East, which would ensure aleading position in the world, was Hitler's ultimate goal, while othersclaim that his ideological position extended to the establishment of Germanworld domination. Plans for Operation Barbarossa paid no attention at all to the termsof the pact, proving, as Stalin claimed, that there had never been anyintention on Hitler's part but to attack Russia when he was ready. He admitted that it was possible that the war against America "wouldhave to take place after he had died" (Hauner 24). The only solution that seemed remotely acceptable to Hitler was theexpansion of the German people into the eastern regions and how this wasaccomplished -- so far as the eventual fate of the population was concerned-- was a matter of little consequence since, as Hitler argued, "the Germanmother of all life was in danger [and] the threat embraced not simply apeople, but world civilization" (Rich 6). Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan. Bythe end of 194 , "from Finland to the Balkan passes there was not aneconomic cord in the east which the Red Army could not have severed orseriously endangered" (Rich 2 4). The British empirewas seen by Hitler as a singular demonstration of the truth of his racialideology and this explains his "vain attempt to draw oversimplifiedparallels" between India and the future of his lebensraum policies.Unfortunately for Hitler the 1941 invasion of Russia was also conceived, inpart, as just such an historical demonstration in the making. Russia's defeat of Finland and annexation of theBaltic states meant that Estonian oil was no longer available and the USSRwas in a position to cut off Germany's access to supplies of ore fromSweden. New Haven, 1961.Mason, Tim. Eichmann had already attemptedto begin the creation of this outer buffer state, in the region allotted tothe USSR, with the deportation of 2, Viennese Jews in October 1939. Ed. ForHitler, who formulated much of his ideology while recovering from woundssuffered in the service of Germany in World war I, the defeat of that war,aggravated by the punitive terms of the Versailles treaty, led him toconsider the danger of Germany's position surrounded by potential threats. The general plan, as it hadbeen described in Mein Kampf, consisted of Anschluss with Austria and theacquisition of the German-speaking regions of Czechoslovakia and Poland.These blitzkriegs would assure German domination of Central Europe andconsiderably increase the Reich's material and human resources. One such form of relief was the plunder of people thatbegan with the invasion of Poland. Acentral element of Hitler's plan, however, was what Hauner calls his"dearest political dream," that is, alliance with Great Britain, "the onlyviable partner for him on racial as well as strategic grounds" (26). Despite the inevitability of fighting on twofronts because of the unexpected continuing strength of Britain and theUnited States' entry into the war, however, Hitler believed that Barbarossawas necessary in practical terms. The attitudes long expressed byHitler toward the Slavic people had certainly "engendered marked hostilitywithin the Russian leadership" and there was no one on either side whofooled himself that the pact was anything but a time-buying measure forboth nations (Barros & Gregor 6). The Gypsies, the Jews, and the Eastern European Slavs"manifestly fell under the rubric of culture-destroying groups" and theirelimination or enslavement was not only essential to the future success ofthe Aryan race, it was a natural process in which the inferior would beforced to serve their superiors (Barros & Gregor 8). Ed. The overwhelming importance of the notion oflebensraum is apparent from the texts studied by SS trainees. At Danzig in August of 1939Hitler had informed the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, Carl J.Burckhardt, not only of his precise plan in terms of the conquest of Europebut of his frustration at the refusal of the racially acceptable British torecognize the point of his actions. The fatal miscalculations thatHitler made in his plan for world domination are all present in the plan.He was in error about British support, he seriously "underestimated theindustrial potential of the USA and her isolationist attitude" toward thewar in Europe, and, perhaps most serious of all insofar as it precipitatedthe end, he "disastrous[ly] miscalculat[ed] Russia's resistance to theGerman onslaught" (Hauner 28). Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest. This protected the regime from appearing to dishonor its commitment to theVolk and protected its reputation with the women's husbands and fathers"whose morale, or prejudices, the regime had to respect" (Mason 18 ). New York, 1993.Rich, Norman. Butfurther blitzkriegs against the Scandinavian nations would ensure that anisolated Britain would be forced to surrender if it had not alreadyaccepted its role as a subordinate partner in Germany's conquests. The Russians clearly understood that there was a racist side to theGerman campaign. As Hitler put it, It is ridiculous to think of a world policy as long as one does not control the Continent . The racial program --basically the maximizing of opportunity for Aryans and the elimination orenslavement of inferior peoples -- required the expansion of the Reich farinto the East. Aside from the fact that many of the deportees were membersof inferior peoples, this plunder ethic also had an ideological straininsofar as foreign workers were used during the war "in a very precise way:to keep to a minimum the sacrifices imposed upon German women" (Mason 18 ). His assessment of thepossibilities of success in eventually defeating Russia in a contest forlebensraum was, aside from his basic assumption of the inferiority ofSlavic peoples, based on a fantasy involving the nature of the long-termstability of the Russian state. The special SS Einsatzgruppenwere organized to follow behind the army and carry out special clean-upmissions in which the local Communist leadership, and 'other' Jews would beroutinely murdered. This portion of the debate over Hitler's ideologicalgoals also shows, however, the futility of attempting to pin down hisprecise intentions on the basis of statements made at different times, indifferent places, and in different circumstances. The essence of any parallels hedrew based on their experience had to be viewed in the context of Hitler's"admiration for the British super-race" whose superiority was mosteffectively demonstrated in his view by "their ability to control withrelatively tiny forces the vast spaces and numerically superior" inferiorpeoples of so much of the world (Hauner 26). His ideological positionsregarding the inherent weakness of the Slavic peoples and the essentialAryan loyalty of the British were both proved entirely wrong in 1941 andOperation Barbarossa served as a demonstration of certain historicaltendencies, but they were not tendencies that Hitler's racial views hadrecognized. The attitude taken toward Slavs, Jews, and Bolsheviks had long beenan essential part of the training of the SS which had been charged since1934 with the conduct of various programs designed to put different aspectsof the Nazi ideology into effect. AdolfEichmann's principal plan in 1939, following the invasion of Poland was tobegin the lebensraum initiative with the division of Poland into threevertical strips. Theseresources would be vital for the campaigns against Belgium, Holland, andFrance. Its consumption ofRussian grain was fifty percent higher than its former imports fromArgentina -- equivalent to the amount used to feed the entire Wehrmacht --and Russia could simply cut Hitler off at any time that it provedconvenient to do so. He had beenfairly explicit about it in Mein Kampf and, with the possible exception ofthe outward appearances of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, he neverswerved in any significant way from his goals. Thiswould free Germany to engage in the battle against the Soviet Union, thesuccess of which would guarantee that the bulk of Eurasia was under itsimmediate rule or firmly under its influence. The resistance ofthe Slavic people to the German onslaught far exceeded anything Hitlerexpected. AsMason mentions, on the occasion of both the French and Russian invasionsthe widespread industrial conscription of German women was only avoided"because conquered labor could be used to fill the gaps" (181). The decision to invade Russia in June 1941, therefore, seemednecessary to Hitler because all existing circumstances in the eastthreatened his major goal of achieving lebensraum for Germany that would bethe base for the future of the Reich. But Hitler added that it would nonetheless benecessary as well for many military commanders to "make the sacrifices oftheir personal scruples" (quoted in Barros & Gregor 8). Thomas Childers and Jane Caplan. But it iscertain that the success of the SS in managing the murder of the thousandsof "Soviet Jews as well as Communist Party officials [who] werespecifically targeted" in Operation Barbarossa helped convince Hitler andthe leadership that Final Solution was a 'practical' possibility(Stackelberg 221). It is a matter of considerable debate whether the actual destructionof the Jews was or was not always a part of Hitler's plan. As Hayes argues, Hitler's actions indeclaring war on Poland earlier than he had intended and his subsequentactions in Russia were motivated in part by the economic imperative that hehad "recognized consistently -- the insufficiency of Germany's resources toachieving world power within the prevailing context" (2 3). But in pursuit of this all-important goal of lebensraum Hitler wasusually extremely pragmatic and one of the high points of this pragmatismwas the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. New York, 1986. Hitler and Russia: The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 1937-1941. Hitler's racist ideology was the foundation on which the idea ofeventually dominating Russia was based and the invasion of the Soviet Unionin June 1941 was an operation carried out in pursuit of lebensraum, theelimination of the Jews, an end to Bolshevism, and eventual Germandomination of the world. The French had longdesired nothing more than "the final destruction of the Germans" and in theEast "a vast expanse of territory provided the breeding grounds for aninexhaustible supply of a particularly brutal species of humanity" (Rich5). In the original 194 planfor Barbarossa Hitler held that the Wehrmacht "must be prepared to crushSoviet Russia in a quick campaign even before the conclusion of the waragainst England" (quoted in Higgins 86). BibliographyBarros, James, & Richard Gregor. But events in 194 and 1941 conspired, in Hitler's view, tomake it necessary to hasten the invasion in order to be prepared for anexpanded war in the near future. Once again, however, any rigidity in demanding anexplicit, planned version of this goal makes it difficult to demonstrateparticular positions. The Russians hoped that even though theyhad agreed to a partitioning of Poland the British would respond to theGerman attack, as promised, and that the two countries would exhaustthemselves in an extended war--greatly to the benefit of the USSR. To place too much emphasis on anyparticular pronouncements, or even actions, distracts from the fact thatthe general scheme laid out in Mein Kampf, and discussed with somefrequency throughout his active political life was the predominant guidefor Hitler, and for Germany, to the end. "The Domestic Dynamics of Nazi Conquests: A Response to Critics." Reevaluating the Third Reich (161-89). Thus the economy played a vital role in Hitler's decision to carryout Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Instead itincreased its strength by raising it to the level of "something more than apolitical movement" (Rich 3). . London, 1999.Stoakes, Geoffrey. In the most basic terms Hitler argued in late 194 that the army wasfree and only the air forces and navy were occupied in pinning downBritain, whose acceptance of Germany's peace terms was expected soon.Thus, he said, it was "necessary to strike while it is possible to do so[and] to destroy the Russian armed forces before they become dangerous"(quoted in Higgins 81-82). The Russiandomination of the Baltic states ended German access to agricultural importsnearly equivalent in value to the amount that Germany was to receive fromRussia in the terms of the treaty. Although the notion oflebensraum, the acquisition of 'living room' for the expansion of the Aryanpeoples, had long been a major factor in Hitler's plans for the Easternfront his planning had also included a commitment to avoid involvingGermany in a two-front war. Schweller and others have more than adequately demonstrated thatworld domination was Hitler's ultimate goal. He was fully aware ofthe immense difficulty of all the challenges of the program and hecertainly expected it to take a great deal more time than he eventuallyhad. But thedecision to take the step of invading Russia at that particular datedepended on the existence of other factors that seemed to Hitler toendanger the health of his general program. Nazism became a form of faith that, by beinglimited in terms of membership, automatically included every true German,whether she or he would have wished for the honor. It was not, he argued, the Slavsthemselves who had been responsible for Russia's success but generations ofimported German masterminds who had demonstrated "the state-buildingcapacity of the Germans as leaders of an inferior race" (Rich 7). "Polycracy and Policy in the Third Reich: The Case of the Economy." Reevaluating the Third Reich (19 -21 ). Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion. . The absurd claim that only the German (or Nordic or Aryan) race wascapable of creating true culture did not, as might have been expected,detract from the appeal of Hitler or National socialism. Hitler himselfunderstood the necessity of a progressive plan and did not foresee anythinglike a superpower confrontation with the United States as taking placeuntil long into the future. ForHitler it was of vital importance, in view of Anglo-French negotiations,that the Soviet Union "be lured into the Axis camp" in order to prevent arecreation of the disastrous Triple Entente (Schweller 138). "Did Hitler Want a World Dominion?" Journal of Contemporary History 13 (1978): 15-32.Hayes, Peter. In Hitler's bizarre "pseudo-anthropological" world view, primarily asexplicated in Mein Kampf, the peoples of the world were divided intoculture-creating, culture-bearing, and culture-destroying groups (Barros &Gregor 7). The fact that not every step taken by Germany in the war yearsseemed to promote Hitler's final goals only meant that not everything couldbe planned for -- not that his general scheme was not the guiding force inpolicy-making and military aims. Once these nations were subdued Germany would have "direct controlover the raw materials, food supplies, and labor reserves of WesternEurope" (Schweller 1 ). Everything that I undertake is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to understand this, then I will be forced to reach an understanding with the Russians, smash the West, and then turn all my concentrated strength against the Soviet Union (quoted in Schweller 139). Stoakes argued, for instance, that "world conquest or world mastery"was an overstatement of Hitler's goals (165). The problem of German security was vital in his view if theHerrenvolk (or Volk) were to flourish as they ought. Other historians have questioned the scope of Hitler's plans. Hitler's basicassumption was that only the German race, by virtue of being the onlyculture-creators, had a right to existence and, accordingly, had a right toexist where and how it was deemed necessary for the race to flourish. Those who questioned the existence of sucha program held that Hitler's direct influence on the formulation of policywas less important than has been assumed. But Hitler's primaryconcern was that Russia was growing too strong and was about to block vitalaccess to the Balkans. . Hitler's Germany: Origins, Interpretations, Legacies. New York, 1998.Stackelberg, Roderick. Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies. It is also important, however, because it shows Hitler's fondness forhistorical demonstrations of his ideological positions. And, asStalin later claimed in self-defense, to have failed to occupy easternPoland "would have led to the German occupation of positions needed by theRussians" (Barros & Gregor 4). This distinction is importantbecause his exasperation at the recalcitrance of the British in resistinghis overtures, as reflected in his 1939 remarks to Burckhardt, was tocontinue to be of great importance up to the time of the Russian invasion. One of Hitler's most famousremarks about the expansion of the Reich to the East was that "What Indiawas for England, the territories of Russia will be for us" (quoted inSchweller 1 ). Thedecline of Russia following its surrender to Jewish-led Bolshevism was aninevitability precisely because this layer of Aryan ingenuity had beenremoved from Russian society. The Japanese had beenassigned a special, albeit secondary, role in Hitler's racial program andthe only remaining power that did not meet his standards was "the Americancontinent dominated by the racially decomposed USA" (Hauner 25). This argument was made in spite of the fact that Hitler hadfrequently, since Mein Kampf, discussed the need for German worlddomination and in spite of the fact that his attitude toward the Britishalways had to be viewed as a special case. Add to these the other states of the New Europe, and we'll be four hundred millions, compared with the hundred and thirty million Americans (quoted in Schweller 1 1).But, as the apocalyptic tone of these remarks indicates, Hitler was notaverse to what must have been, to him, pleasant speculations about theultimate achievement of his plans. And in Mein Kampf Hitler had referred to "thereinforcement of British world dominion" as that nation's guiding foreignpolicy concept in the earlier part of the century (quoted in Stoakes 165).Britain could in no way have been said to have obtained world mastery ordomination and in equating Germany's achievement of lebensraum (certainlynot an exact parallel with Britain's control of India) with Britishimperial power, Stoakes argued, Hitler probably did not mean "actual worldconquest" but preeminence among a few other principal powers (Stoakes 166). The preparations for Operation Barbarossa began in the summer of194 , but the Germans had insufficient good weather left to make theattempt that year. But in planning the operation the German leadership waswarned to immediately begin to prepare the army for a very different kindof war. The medievalemperor Friedrich I Hohenstaufens, popularly known as Barbarossa, or RedBeard, had died "in the course of leading all the Germanic peoples on avast, if somewhat amorphous, expedition to the East" and legend held thatFriedrich, buried in the Harz Mountains, was destined to rise again to leadEurope "on a new crusade against the infidel East" (Higgins 86). The great irony, of course, is that Hitler's assumption that Russiancollapse was inevitable was based in large part on his belief in theinferiority of the Slavic people and the fanatical belief that Bolshevismwas "identical with the advent of the world Jewish conspiracy" and was,therefore, even more susceptible to collapse in the face of concentratedGerman opposition (Hauner 28). He argued that the decline of the Aryan race was to a considerable degreedue to the habits of miscegenation which resulted in a decrease in theirracial level. But what Stalin may not have suspected was the actualdegree of savagery that Hitler intended to direct against his country -- anattitude that was also to have a direct effect on the formulation of the so-called Final Solution of the Nazi-invented 'problem' of European Jewry.The forced migration, deportation, ghettoization, and internment ofhundreds of thousands of Jews had been underway for some time but theproblem of what to do with the Jews had never been solved. The region closest to Germany would be inhabited,eventually, solely by Germans and the second band would be filled withPolish laborers forced to work for Germany in mines, farms, and industry.The third region, also a site of forced labor, would be filled with theJews deported from the rest of the Reich. This does not mean, however, that Hitler'sinsane version of social Darwinism was the sole consideration in hisconstruction of a general plan for world domination. And Hitler evenadmitted the possibility of defeat, albeit in extremist terms, when he saidthat "Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany"(quoted in Hauner 28). Double Deception: Stalin, Hitler, and the Invasion of Russia. This scheme grew out his racialviews and they colored every decision from the earliest aggression to theHolocaust, and the conquest of Russia was a keystone in Hitler's plan. The immensedifferences between the rational West and East were carefully explained interms of the failure of the inferior races even to manage to farm properly: Badly exploited, fertile soil of black earth that could be a paradise, a California of Europe, and in reality abandoned, dreadfully neglected, branded with the stamp of a crime against culture beyond imagination [it] is a perpetual accusation against the sub-human and his rule (quoted in Kamenetsky 38). Thus it is also important to view any of hisremarks in the context of the limitations of reality. A hundred and thirty million people in the Reich, ninety in the Ukraine. But the difficulty, as Haunerpoints out, is that this rigid conception of a plan belies the actualitiesof war and the need to accommodate one's general goals to the exigencies ofthe moment. In internal economic terms, German industry worked at top speed inevery sector but Hitler fully understood that there was a limit to itsproductivity and that relief in various forms would have to be found as hisplans progressed. Theconception of the attack on Russia as a major move in the Nazi 'holy war'on the east was apparent from the title of the operation. The basic mission of the SS in regard tothe official "others" was, as one SS official described it, to enable theestablishment of the ideal Aryan state "by eradicating all inferiorelements from the racial and biological point of view [and] by eliminatingsuch of our political opponents as are incapable of conversion or refuse onprincipal to recognise" the vital need for the success of the Nazi Party(quoted in Kamenetsky 39). Aftersufficient time had passed for fully absorbing the resources of the USSRGermany could then "unleash the inevitable conflict against the moreremote" United States (Schweller 1 1). Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion. Despite the undeniable lucidity of this explanation there has alwaysbeen a great deal of dispute among historians as to whether Hitler did "infact have any specific design, a master plan, a definite blueprint for theaggression he was preparing for and which was to unfold, stage by stage,from 1933 to 1945" (Hauner 15). Butthis effort "was halted for lack of railroad cars" and as late as 194 Eichmann and others were still proposing such plans as the deportation of 4million Jews, "under concentration-camp-like conditions that were expectedto decimate their numbers," to the African island of Madagascar(Stackelberg 22 -21). These were the overall goals that Hitler hadformulated two decades earlier and had pursued ever since. As Grand Admiral Raeder pointed out to Hitler,however, the threats to Britain in North Africa and the Middle East werebeing removed "concentration of the entire war effort against England" wasthe most urgent need of the moment (Higgins 91). But in the end Hitler and his commanders had made the far moreelementary mistake of underestimating the capacity of the Soviet Union toproduce the arms and ordered troops needed to continue the resistance farbeyond even the most generous German estimates. New York, 1966.Kamenetsky, Ihor. Hitler had been quite frank aboutthe eventual goal to which he had dedicated the German people. Most vitally, however, Germany wasgrowing increasingly dependent on Russian exports. Hitler told the military leaders that the Bolshevik leadershipwould have to be "exterminated" and that "force [would be] used in its mostbrutal form" (quoted in Barros & Gregor 8). In the south the Russians had occupied Bessarabia and NorthernBukovina in Rumania -- essentially placing them in the position to cut offGerman access to Rumanian oil and Balkan grain -- since they were incontrol of the mouth of the Danube and all land routes to the Balkans. He always stressed the dependence of each partof his general scheme on that which was to precede it. While he certainly held that it wasnecessary on grounds related to his ideology of race this was not the onlyfactor involved in the timing of the invasion. DeKalb, Illinois, 1995.Hauner, Milan. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 has often beendescribed as "the greatest blunder of the Second World War" and historianshave long debated the relative contributions of ideology and strategy toHitler's decision to implement Operation Barbarossa, as the invasion wasknown, at this particular time (Rich 2 4). Although these peoples had been held back by the efforts of the Volkfor centuries they were capable of imitating German creativity andreproducing the technology and organization that the Aryans produced.Because of their immense numbers and this imitative capability, Hitlerwarned, the hordes of Slavs, assisted by the efforts of the largestconcentrations of Jews on earth, would eventually overwhelm the Reich ifnothing was done to stop them. The population of Germany was simplyinsufficient to the needs of the Nazi military program and the use ofprisoners of war or deportees -- a total of eight million in Germany duringthe war -- as forced labor was one of the principal means of coping withthis problem. Domination of Central Europe would ensure thatHungary and other nations were within Germany's sphere of influence. New York, 1992.Schweller, Randall L. New York, 1993.Higgins, Trumball. It was absolutely essential, afterconsidering every other possibility, that the Volk obtain more land tosupply their material and security needs. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.