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CUBAN MISSLE CRISIS.   Term Paper ID:28527 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Analyzes origins, reactions, management, resolution & consequences of Oct. 1962 political crisis.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Analyzes origins, reactions, management, resolution & consequences of Oct. 1962 political crisis. Paper Introduction: ANALYSES OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS This research paper analyzes at different levels the origins, management and resolution, and consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. A careful study of all the material on that crisis which is now available suggests that no single level of analysis is adequate to explain the crisis. The thesis of this paper is: (1) while the immediate cause of the crisis was the Soviet decision to deploy secretly in Cuba medium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs, respectively), which produced a dangerous confrontation between the world's nuclear superpowers, misconceptions, misunderstandings and mistakes by both sides helped bring about the crisis and magnified its intensity; (2) although responsible statesmanship on both sides enabled them eventually to resolve Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Meanwhile, the American preparatory conventional military buildup inFlorida was reaching fever pitch. & David A. Do it now and you'll have fewercomplications."[xii] The merit in the airstrike approach was that it wouldaddress the threat before many of the missiles were operational ordefensible whereas the quarantine left the issue of missile removalunresolved. In the early meetings, EXCOM'sconsensus was in favor of a pre-emptive airstrike, which JFK appeared tosupport. JFK was successful in convincingthem that his threat of using military force in Cuba was credible. Difficult negotiationsover the terms of the settlement, the form of inspection, which ended upbeing American overflights, and whether IL-28s would be removed as well asthe missiles were settled by often contentious negotiations at the UN inwhich Ambassadors John McCloy and Vasily Kuznetsov tussled. Management of the Crisis According to most conventional accounts at the time, JFK's managementof the crisis was masterful, especially in bringing American militarypressure to bear in removing the missiles while at the same time permittingtempers to cool and diplomacy to work while he found a way out of thecrisis short of war. The administration carried off the quarantine in a manner thatavoided serious incidents at sea. The crisis was resolved when JFK and his advisors decided to ignoreKhrushchev's second letter and accepted the terms implicit in his firstmissive. The Soviets completely misread the American political scene which JFKwell-understood. However, by 1962he had little to show for his efforts. The evidence suggests that the failure ofhis gamble played an important role in his eventual ouster from power inOctober 1964. They also agreed to install a hot line to improvecommunications between them in an emergency, which the crisis showed wasbadly needed. This led to speculation thatKhrushchev might be losing self-control or be under pressure fromhardliners in the Kremlin. Denials that offensive missiles were in Cuba werecoupled with statements that they were there for defensive purposes only.Khrushchev showed his anger at the situation, but the Soviets did not makeany moves to escalate the crisis, other than threats to run the illegalAmerican blockade. . Even so, Anastas Mikoyan warned himthat the maintenance of secrecy over so vast an enterprise was impossible.Even Gromyko, who was not known for his candor in dealing with hissuperiors, told Khrushchev in late May that the Cuban missile deploymentwould cause "a political explosion in the U.S."[viii] In fact, the Sovietsat the missile sites made little effort to camouflage the missiles, makingtheir discovery by overflying U-2s relatively easy, nor did they hardenthem nor complete the SAM anti-aircraft system before erecting themissiles. Nevertheless, JFK had a political and bureaucratic problem.Brugioni said the JCS then and during the remainder of the crisis wasunanimously "for immediate military action, believing that a blockade ofCuba would be ineffective."[xi] The military, however, undercut its owncase by coming up with an overkill attack plan involving 5 sorties whichwas not tailored to the specific targets involved and by being unwilling toguarantee that 1 percent of the missiles could be taken out, thus raisingthe specter of an invasion and massive casualties. The Soviets couldhave provided conventional military assistance to Cuba to deter an Americaninvasion. The subject had come up in severalearlier discussions and the Soviets may have gotten the impression that theissue was negotiable. Theprospect of nuclear incineration diminished -- at least for awhile. The thesis of this paper is: (1) while the immediatecause of the crisis was the Soviet decision to deploy secretly in Cubamedium range and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs,respectively), which produced a dangerous confrontation between the world'snuclear superpowers, misconceptions, misunderstandings and mistakes by bothsides helped bring about the crisis and magnified its intensity; (2)although responsible statesmanship on both sides enabled them eventually toresolve the crisis short of war, actions each took during the crisisgenerated pressures and an escalatory dynamic which helped generatetensions which brought the world close to brink of nuclear conflict; and(3) even though war was avoided, the consequences of the crisis were mixed,and were neither as obvious nor as salutory as at first appeared to be thecase. The truth is more complicated. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington,DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), 1 .Garthoff, 25.Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 49.Dino A. The Cambridge participants were surprised tolearn in 1987 that Rusk claimed that JFK had instructed him to contactAndrew Cordier to explore publicly at the UN a Turkish missiles for Cubanmissiles deal. During the first two years after Fidel Castro's 26th of July movementtook power in Havana, Khrushchev provided only limited assistance to Cuba,partly because he had doubts concerning Castro's commitment to worldcommunism and because he was convinced the United States would use itspredominant military power in the region to remove Castro. Conclusion The origins, management and resolution and consequences of the CubanMissile Crisis do not lend themselves to simplified or superficialanalysis. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first,which Taylor described as "a worried, preoccupied message-the mosttormented communique I have ever read," contained language which suggestedthat Khrushchev was very concerned about the possibility of a nuclear warbreaking out. Khrushchev showed he was in control. The humiliating nature of the Sovietretreat from its Cuban nuclear deployment was a factor in that buildup butprobably was not decisive since the achievement of nuclear parity with theUnited States remained a primary goal of all Soviet leaders until the mid-198 s. Origins of the Crisis Conventional accounts in the United States at the time of the crisisand thereafter viewed the Soviet decision to place MRBMs and IRBMs in Cubaas an unprovoked act of Soviet aggression and in the Soviet Union as alegitimate effort by the Russians to defend the communist regime of Cubawhich was under threat of American attack. In thespring of 1962, the American navy conducted ORTSAC amphibious exercises inthe Caribbean, a mockup of a Cuban invasion. We Now Know. It simplywould not believe that the Soviets would embark on such a risky adventure.JFK approved the resumption of U-2 overflight missions which ultimatelydiscovered MRBM sites in western Cuba, but only did so after John McCone,the CIA Director insisted. The likely presence of nuclear warheads inCuba and the probable completion of the missile sites and defenses within ashort time caused EXCOM to agree that something firmer than merenegotiations was required to counter the Soviet move; otherwise, the UnitedStates would be faced with a fait accompli. Only in 1987 did it become clear, said Gaddis, that Lt. He gave orders formissile and other construction activities in Cuba to proceed posthaste. His hopes of stabilizing the armsrace with the United States and thereby releasing more funds to revive thestagnant Russian economy stalled after he himself scuttled the May 196 Paris summit in the wake of the Soviet shootdown of Gary Powers' U-2.Khrushschev's repeated threats to alter the status of West Berlin had beenrepeatedly stymied. Achievement of surprise required not onlyelaborate tactical deception measures but outright lying to the Americansby Khrushchev, Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, and GeorgiBolshakov, an unofficial KGB emissary to the Kennedy brothers. Beschloff, The Crisis Years Kennedy and Khrushchev 196 -1963(New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 387.Allison, 124-125.Beschloss, 448.Brugioni, 263.Ibid., 36 .Garthoff, 38.Brugioni, 447.Gaddis, 276.Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Oxford Up, 1974), 89.Ibid., 275.Chayes, 5.----------------------- 1 Even, however, during this phase of the crisis when events appearedto be tilting in favor of the United States, several disturbing signsdemonstrated that the military was chafing at the bit and could get out ofcontrol. A careful study of all the material on that crisis which isnow available suggests that no single level of analysis is adequate toexplain the crisis. Eyeball to Eyeball The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis. had superiority.[xiii]As evidence poured in that more and more missile and SAM sites werebecoming operational, the pressures mounted on JFK to invade Cuba duringthe early part of the last week of October. Consequences JFK's supporters heralded the outcome of the crisis as "the finesthour of the Kennedy administration," a triumph of American statecraft andas a defeat for the Soviets.[xviii] Khrushchev claimed that the Soviets hadachieved their objective, the elimination of the American threat ofinvasion of Cuba. Miscalculation and misunderstanding had much to do with itsorigins. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998.Garthoff, Raymond L. GeneralStepan Grechko, commander of air defense in Cuba, "apparently jumped to theconclusion that because the Cubans were firing war had started and allrestrictions were off."[xv] JFK wisely delayed retaliating. Phase II Deepening of the Crisis The Kennedy administration succeeded in keeping its deliberationssecret until JFK's speech (even though JFK had to intervene personally tokill a New York Times story on it) which provided it sufficient time toconsider all the options and to organized its naval and diplomatic effort;however, this was another stroke of good fortune enjoyed by the Americans. In Cuba, trigger-happy Cubans fired atAmerican low-level reconnaissance planes. New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.Bruglioni, Dino A. A SA-2 missile downed an AmericanU-2 over Cuba. Phase I American Response and Soviet Reaction American Decision to Impose a Naval Quarantine. Essence of Decision. "Khrushchev thought Kennedy too young,intellectual, not prepared for decision making in crisis situations."[i]The role, if any, played by this perception by Khrushchev of Kennedy in theorigins of the Cuban Missile Crisis is still unclear. Although JFK had implicitly acquiesced in theconstruction of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961, the United Stateshad stood firm on Western rights of access to Berlin and had launched amajor defense buildup. There was confusion over who had shot it down and on whoseorders. On the Brink Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was accompanied by what was in effect an ultimatum deliveredby RFK to Dobrynin and a separate, secret understanding under which theUnited States undertook to remove the Turkish missiles within six months.Khrushchev broadcast Soviet acceptance on Sunday. If the missiles had not been discovered in time,the Kennedy administration would have found itself in a even worse quandrythan it in fact did after October 14. The overriding concern about their mutual incineration led theleaders of both superpowers to exercise prudence in managing the crisis andresolving it, despite the obvious difficulties they experienced in doingso. The Soviet decision, which wasmade by Chairman Nikita Khrushchev after consultation with some of hisclosest associates in the Politburo in April-May 1962, appears to have beenbased on a mixture of motivations and fundamental Soviet misconceptionsconcerning the likely American reaction. Neither nuclear warheads nor MRBMs nor IRBMs were needed ifKhrushchev's only objective was Cuban defense. However, with RFK playing a key role in EXCOM and behind thescenes with the President, a consensus gradually evolved in favor ofimposing a naval blockade or quarantine as a first step. The advantage ofthe quarantine was that it gave the Russians time to consider the rashnessof their gambit and the United States the opportunity to rally worldsupport behind its position while also preparing for more forcefulalternatives. Khrushchev sent conflictingsignals. He was also faced with a politicalproblem. The Cuban Missile Crisis. No satisfactory explanations for these glaring omissions, exceptpossibly military inertia or inefficiency, as suggested by Allison, hasever surfaced.[ix] The Soviets underestimated the ferocity of the likely Americanreaction to the discovery of the missiles in Cuba. Although Secretary of Defense RobertMcNamara held early on that the Soviet missiles in Cuba did not appreciablyalter the Soviet-American nuclear balance, the members of EXCOM quicklyconcluded that the Soviet move seriously threatened American interests inan area of traditional vital American concern, the Western Hemisphere. New York: Random House, 1991.Chayes, Abram. Even though JFK refused to formalize the no-invasion pledge, theUnited States has observed the tacit agreement not to invade Cuba fornearly 3 years, thus making Khrushchev's assessment partially correct.However, a round trip Caribbean cruise for his rocket forces was hardlywhat he envisaged as the outcome. Khrushchev held back Soviet missile-carrying freighters which on October 24 reversed course and headed home.JFK and McNamara ordered the quarantine interception line to be movedfurther east and let some vessels under Soviet charter and finally theSoviet tanker Bucharest to pass through the blockade. The Crisis Years Kennedy And Khrushchev 196 -1963. The United States had a decisive advantage instrategic nuclear weaponry and delivery systems in 1962 variously estimatedat from 7:1 to 17:1.[v] The placement of MRBMs and IRBMs and necessarysupporting forces was, therefore, conceived by Krushchev as a way, saidGeorgi Shaknazarov in Cambridge in 1987, to achieve "cheap parity," to atleast partially offset American nuclear superiority by placing Sovietmissiles within range of American cities, which doubled (or trebled) Sovietfirst-strike capabilities.[vi] In his unofficial memoirs, Khrushchev said"our missiles would have equalized what the West likes to call 'the balanceof power.'"[vii] Khrushchev's plan, which involved the shipment and installation inCuba of large numbers of MRBMs and IRBMs armed with conventional andnuclear warheads, IL-28s, SA-2 (SAM) anti-aircraft batteries, a sizableprotecting force and other elements, depended for its success on theRussians being able to complete their installation without their beingdetected by the United States. Armageddon was avoided and a good deal of the credit isdue to both Kennedy and Khrushchev for drawing back from the brink andmaintaining control over their respective forces and hawks, a task in whichJFK had by far the most difficult task. Due to thedictatorial nature of the Soviet regime and the need for secrecy,Khrushchev did not thoroughly vet his Cuban missile gamble within the fullPolitburo or the senior bureaucracy. ANALYSES OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS This research paper analyzes at different levels the origins,management and resolution, and consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis ofOctober 1962. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.Beschloss, Michael R. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.Blight, James G. Most historians have completely dismissed the possible wisdomof a pre-emptive airstrike. Blight & David A. When SAC went to DEFCON 2 (the penultimatealert before war) on October 24, the alert was broadcast by General ThomasPowers in 'the clear,' which Garthoff said, "he did on his own initiative". The Soviets inthe end acknowledged that it was preferable to leave a Cuba withoutmissiles than an American-dominated Cuba. Castro, and increasinglyKhrushchev, became convinced that the United States would use its ownforces to oust Castro. In fact, it appears that Khrushchev met with keymembers of the Politburo who were ready to remove the missiles to avoid warbut they wanted to obtain some concessions. The Western allies were briefed and the OAS votedunanimously to support the quarantine. The provenance of the Turkishfor Cuban missiles proposal is unclear. The consequences of the crisis were more sobering than definitive. The Soviets were caught napping, and reactedin a confused manner. The use of secrecy andsurprise was bound to resurrect memories of Pearl Harbor and to produceboth anger and deep concern as to Soviet motives. Endnotes BibliographyAllison, Graham T. Poor weather played a part in the failure of the U-2s to photographthe missile construction sites before the U-2 flight of October 14, 1962,but until late September, missions were postponed or restricted toperipheral flights (as opposed to overflights) due to fears expressed bySecretary of State Dean Rusk of adverse world reactions to an incident andbureaucratic infighting between CIA and the Pentagon over which agencyshould control the flights. Anuclear holocaust was, however, averted by a narrower margin that mostpeople supposed at the time. An open question is whether JFK would have invaded Cuba if Khrushchevhad not accepted his terms. The last two days of the crisis were jam-packed with happenings whichconfused the participants, accentuated tensions and have led to varyinginterpretations by analysts ever since.Khrushchev sent two letters, one received by the Americans on Friday,October 25, and the second, on 'Black Saturday,' October 27. All one can say is that his decisionto back the Bay of Pigs invasion and then deny the landing force Americanair and naval support left the Soviets with an inconsistent impression. According to Garthoff, "no one in the U.S. Welch, On the Brink Americans and SovietsReassess the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 236.Raymond L. Chayes said that over the weekend "pressures within thegovernment for an attack were formidable."[xvi] If American forces hadinvaded, it was learned from Soviet military sources in the late 198 s thatthe invading force "would have encountered a Soviet force at least fourtimes larger than intelligence estimates indicated, and were unexpectedlyequipped with nuclear weapons."[xvii] The only thing that safely can besaid is that both leaders in the final analysis kept their head and avoidedtaking actions which could easily have triggered a nuclear conflict. It also seemed to contain a Soviet proposal for ending thecrisis, removal of the missiles in return for an American pledge not toinvade Cuba, but its disjointed presentation was far from clear.[xiv] Thesecond letter conditioned removal of the missiles on the Americandismantling of its missiles in Turkey. A Greek freighterunder Soviet charter, the Marcula, was peacefully boarded by an Americandestroyer on October 26. New York: Oxford UP, 1974.Gaddis, John Lewis. McNamara and Admiral George Anderson got into angry confrontationsover McNamara's insistence on calling the shots at sea and Anderson'sreluctance to cede tactical control over the blockade to a civilian.American naval anti-submarine tactics 'held down' Soviet submarines whichfortunately did not shoot back. It will never be known what the consequences ofone would have been. As Soviet military aid to Cuba increased in 1961-1962, JFK issued anumber of statements indicating that American patience was not unlimited,but his clear warnings to the Soviets not to introduce 'offensive' weaponsin Cuba on September 4 and September 13, 1962 came too late because somearms had already arrived in Cuba and the most of the rest were en route bysea. However, thefailure of the American-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban emigres inApril 1961 caused him to reconsider. JFK handled thesepressures from the hawks skillfully. JFK made the keyAmerican decisions with the advice of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) ofthe National Security Council. Claims from rightwingers such asGeneral Curtis LeMay that the United States suffered the worst defeat inits history by making a settlement with the Russians have not stood thetest of time, especially since we now know a local tactical nuclearresponse would have set in motion a series of hard to imagine or controlescalating consequences. Garthoff said itsimportance "has been fairly well debunked."[ii] Kennedy did handle theBerlin crisis of 1961 in a surehanded manner, but it took him time to gainconfidence as a foreign policy leader. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987.-----------------------James G. After the Bay of Pigs, the United States mounted a series of actionsdesigned to weaken the Castro regime and/or to remove him from power,including sabotage and commando raids and assassination attempts. Another positive result of the crisis is that thereafter thetwo superpowers exercised a degree of caution in avoiding similar nuclearconfrontations. "to rub it in" to the Russians that the U.S. Ever since the Bay ofPigs JFK had been under political attack for being 'soft' on communism inCuba, which rose in intensity in August-September 1962 when Senator KennethKeating and other Republicans accused JFK of ignoring the Soviet buildup inCuba. Initial Soviet Reaction. In fact, in 1962 the United States had not made anydecision to invade Cuba, but the Soviets and the Cubans, who clamored forincreased Soviet military aid, clearly had reason to fear that it would.Little, if any, credence was later given to this set of Soviet motivationsby American leaders. . Theissue, as General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) put it, was whether the missiles would be removed by talking,squeezing or shooting them out. He told his brother Robert after the crisis was over thatif he had not succeeded in removing the missiles, "I would have beenimpeached."[x] The Americans missed several opportunities to nip the crisis in thebud. At the United Nations on October 25,American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson effectively lambasted the SovietAmbassador. governmentbelieved that the deployment of Soviet missiles was intended to deter aU.S. In an interview with a Westinghouse executive, William Knox, onOctober 24, he spoke of the need to avert war and indicated a desire tomeet with JFK while in the same interview made bellicose remarks aboutSoviet submarines having orders to shoot back if they were attacked. His ordersreached the Air Force just in time. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball The Inside Story of the Cuban MissileCrisis (New York: Random House, 1991), 254.Blight, 258.John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998), 265.Michael R. Despite accumulating evidence to the contraryfrom Cuban refugees, agents in Cuba, French intelligence and other sources,the Kennedy administration was reluctant to believe the obvious. As Allison put it, "theSoviet Union assumed risks manifestly out of proportion to the needs ofCuban defense."[iv] Over the opposition of parts of the military and theParty, Khrushchev had sponsored a major buildup of strategic nuclear forces(at the expense of conventional forces) and had used the Soviet Union'sgrowing prowess in rocketry to support his foreign policy. When he briefed Congressional leaders before his October 22 speechto the nation, Democratic Senator Richard Russell told him: "you'll have toinvade Cuba sooner or later. Welch. Both sides, however, quickly resumed their nuclear arms race, andcommunications between them, while somewhat improved during the period ofdétente in the 197 s, remained poor. invasion of Cuba."[iii] The defense of Cuba was, however, not the only or perhaps not eventhe primary impetus behind Khrushchev's fateful gamble. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.