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NAPOLEON AT AUSTERLITZ.   Term Paper ID:28639 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Analysis of Napoleon's 1805 planned invastion of England. Background. Napolean's strategy; his battle at Austerlitz with Austria & Russia.... More...

8 Pages / 1800 Words 4 sources, 21 Citations, APA Format $32.00 Return to List of Papers

Paper Abstract: Analysis of Napoleon's 1805 planned invastion of England. Background. Napolean's strategy; his battle at Austerlitz with Austria & Russia. Paper Introduction: NAPOLEON AT AUSTERLITZ "The first principle of a generalinchief is to calculate what he must do, to see if he has all the means to surmount the obstacles with which the enemy can oppose him and, when he has made his decision, to do everything to overcome them."  Napoleon INTRODUCTION: In the late summer of 1805, the Emperor Napoleon had assembled nearly 200,000 men on the Channel coast for a planned invasion of England, who - together, with Austria, Russia, and several minor powers - had formed the Third Coalition to oppose Napoleon. By early autumn, Austrian troops advanced into Bavaria and northern Italy while a Russian army began marching west. England supported the war effort with minor coastal Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. A frantic alliedcommand was soon trying to shift troops back to the endangered PratzenHeights (Blond, 1995, 72). A company of troops would be deployed forwardto fire individually from cover on the formed-up enemy line. This wasgeneralship at its best. Napoleonic methods represented theultimate development of musket-line warfare (Nosworthy, 1996, 124). As the fog continued to evaporate in the morning sunshine,Napoleon watched the reduction of allied troops on Pratzen Heights. The corps contained all three arms - infantry,artillery and cavalry - and was fairly similar in both size and compositionto one of Frederick's ad hoc field armies. French cavalry numbered fewer than 8, , giving the allies a 3-1advantage in mounted soldiers (Blond, 1995, 65). When hejudged the moment to be right, he ordered Gen. Prior to 1812, strategically organized national armiesgave Napoleon a decisive advantage over his adversaries because hisadversaries did not have such an army (Nosworthy, 1996, 65-66). Napoleon, in contrast, lost only 6,8 men.After this disaster, the Russians retreated and Austria sued for peace. Once battle was engaged, Napoleon had the benefit of two new tacticalformations developed by revolutionary armies in 1792 to 1794. Key geographical features in this areawere Goldbach Creek in the south, which became Bosenitz Creek furthernorth; a road running between the towns of Br?nn and Austerlitz; a plateaucalled Pratzen Heights on the east side of the Goldbach-Bosenitz creeks;Santon Hill to the north of the road and east of the creeks; and two largeponds east of the creeks and several miles south of Pratzen Heights.Napoleon had his forces occupy the plateau and spread out along the creeksand also placed troops along Santon Hill by the road. In September, the "Grande Armee"marched across the Rhine. The regiment was the only maneuver unit; there was no militaryorganization except regimental organization. By mid-November, Napoleon held Vienna, the Austrian capital.Prussia, although favoring the coalition, remained a cautious neutral(Haythornwaite, 199 , 22). As 5, or more soldiers fled in the vicinityof the frozen ponds in the south, French cannon balls targeted SatchonPond, drowning nearly 2, allied soldiers in the icy water. Independent maneuver echelons, battalion andcompany, emerged below the level of the regiment. One of thesewas the use of skirmishers. Four hundred officers on the staff ofNapoleon's Grande Armee guaranteed that the distribution of supplies waswell organized. Also important, however, was the fact that patriotic troopsand officers were willing to live lean and did not need much supply. This required superiormobility and agility, which, of course, Napoleon had. NAPOLEON AT AUSTERLITZ "The first principle of a general-in-chief is to calculate what hemust do, to see if he has all the means to surmount the obstacles withwhich the enemy can oppose him and, when he has made his decision, todo everything to overcome them." - NapoleonINTRODUCTION: In the late summer of 18 5, the Emperor Napoleon had assembled nearly2 , men on the Channel coast for a planned invasion of England, who -together, with Austria, Russia, and several minor powers - had formed theThird Coalition to oppose Napoleon. In therevolutionary armies any troops could be trusted to do this. On December 2, 18 5, the two sides met at Austerlitz, whereNapoleon crushed one wing of the allied army and drove another away afterbreaking through their center. (Blond, 1995, 74) Napoleon reinforced his right flank, where French troops had heldheroically. The French Revolution invented modern strategicorganization (Nosworthy, 1996, 1 4). The Grande Armee had 139 artillery pieces; the allies had278. Nicolas-Jean de Dieu Soultto have French troops walk in formation toward Pratzen Heights; this wasthe "assault column" the allies had yet to understand. Haythornwaite, Philip J.: The Napoleonic Source Book; New York: FactsOn File; 199 .----------------------- 1 All funds, orders, andregulations were now to come from the people's elected representatives, andfrom them only. In thestill dynastic armies of his adversaries, both aristocratic officers andmercenary troops were reluctant to campaign without the comforts ofabundant supply. England supported the war effort with minor coastalinvasions in Italy and Germany (Haythornwaite, 199 , 22). Since thearmy now served the nation, unprecedented resources, funds and troops,flowed reliably into the army; soldiers at all levels considered the armyas their own and were more loyal to it. He feigned retreat, attacked in force where unexpected, splithis opponent's force in two, and then overpowered each flank. His troops lit torches to commemorate the emperor's coronation ayear before, as Napoleon moved among them, rousing them with his personalcharisma. He could catch them andthreaten to cut their lines without worrying too much about theirthreatening his(Nosworthy, 1996, 114). In Frederick's army, fifteen regiments lined up abreast, commanded bythe monarch. Both may be seen at their best in the most famous ofNapoleon's victories, Austerlitz (Nosworthy, 1996, 134).THE BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ: The Battle of Austerlitz was fought east of the town of Brunn, inwhat is today the Czech Republic. 2, his heavy concentration of troops across from PratzenHeights and to the north was concealed by a heavy fog. Most of the major organizational features ofmodern armies had emerged by 1815. The squares then had to open back out into line to bring their fullfirepower to bear on the advancing Napoleonic artillery or infantry.Napoleon repeated this exercise until a gap appeared in the enemy line,which prompted him to dispatch, again, the force de rupture. Once in the vicinity of the opposing force, Napoleon used theprinciple of concentration and mass to overwhelm his adversary. This allowed Napoleon to dosomething Frederick's armies could never do: force engagement (Nosworthy,1996, 27). The use of loyal national armies gave Napoleon important logisticaladvantages over his adversaries. Ideological loyalties to the nationalmost nonexistent in Frederick's day, were heightened. The impact of these changes was colossal. The essenceof this method was to use the bulk of his own force to destroy isolatedparts of the enemy force before they could unite. There he waitedpatiently as Russian and Austrian forces converged on the area to the eastof Austerlitz (Blond, 1995, 64). Napoleon's intention, expressed in afew words, would now mobilize a corps of 3 , troops, working inautonomous and complex ways at several levels and relying on their own bestjudgment and experience, for the common strategic purpose. Foes could not easily maneuver out ofthe way of this advancing 12 -mile front. Allied troops tried to retake the high ground, but French cannonson the plateau rained fire on them. Moreover, Napoleon's patriotictroops could live off the land. French regiments ceased to be the private property of monarchs andregimental colonels and became the property of the nation. Because retreating armies burned whatever they did not take tokeep it from the enemy, this was another indication to the allies that theFrench were going to retreat at dawn (Blond, 1995, 66). Nosworthy, Brent: With Musket, Cannon and Sword: Battle Tactics ofNapoleon and His Enemies; New York: Sarpedon; 1996. A haze of smoke fromthe campfires the night before also hung in the air (Blond, 1995, 7 ). Allied forces there were cut off from other allied forces anddesperately tried to escape. Revolutionary armies, short on training but long onmanpower, assaulted in a mass formation rather than in line. Some,including Napoleon, say this was his finest battle, overcoming superiornumbers and displaying tactical skills that are being studied even today(Perrett, 1993, 35-36).BACKGROUND TO BATTLE: THE REVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION In the history of modern war, modern strategic organization hasspread steadily since 1815. After hard-fought battles in all sectors, the allied army was splitin two. Once this was done Napoleon would pull the cavalry back andsend artillery or infantry forward to pound the compact formations withfire. By afternoon,the French had won decisively with 27, allied casualties (11, dead)compared with 8, French casualties (1,3 dead) (Blond, 1995, 79).CONCLUSIONS: Napoleon's battle plan used deception, concealment, surprise, andflexibility. Using thecreeks to draw his line of defense, he left his right flank weak andconcentrated his main forces in the area across from Pratzen Heights and tothe north. He attacked with heavy cavalry, compelling the enemy to draw his lineinto squares. The French had 67,5 men; the combined Russian and Austrian forcesnumbered 85,7 . Napoleonretained this assault column capability and often used it to advantage(Nosworthy, 1996, 1 5). The other revolutionary formation Napoleon incorporated wasthe assault column. Blond, Georges: La Grande Armee; London: Arms and Armour Press; 1995. Napoleon would attack a flank, forcing his adversary to thin his linesomewhere to assemble the force needed to repel the flank attack. Napoleon's skill atthis aspect of warfare was probably unmatched while he was at his height(Nosworthy, 1996, 28). 2, Napol?on withdrew his troops from Pratzen Heights, givingthe allies the impression that he was preparing to retreat. Most of what we think of as modern military organization emerged in aparoxysm of conflict that rocked western Europe for twenty-four years from1792 to 1815: the Napoleonic Wars. Each of theseechelons had its own commander and staff and all the diverse resourcesneeded for its mission. As with most battles of that era, troop strength estimates andcasualty figures vary, but it is clear that Naopl?on was outnumbered by theallies. The new force and the new methods are the subjectof this lesson. Few have emerged since (Nosworthy, 1996,67).The Military Revolution:The French Revolution transformed armies from being dynastic, privatearmies, as they had been in Frederick's day, to being national, publicarmies. Multilevel staffing, plus self-sufficiency, plus loyal personnel at all levels profoundly increased thepossibilities for command and control. In themonarchical armies, infantry asked to do this would often go to ground orabscond. When the suncame up on Dec. The army no longer served the king; it served the nation(Blond, 1995, 71). The upshot wasthat Napoleon could control seven corps on the field more easily thanFrederick could control one(Nosworthy, 1996, 11 ).The Napoleonic Battle: For strategic approach, Napoleon was able to use the bataillon carr?,a formation whereby different corps moved forward abreast along parallelroads flung across a 12 -mile front. As Austrian and Russian forces continued to gather in the dayspreceding Dec. The allies reduced their troop strength on Pratzen Heights to bolsterthe forces that would hit the right, turn the flank, and then roll up theFrench line. Napoleonwould then drive a heavy force, the force de rupture, through the part ofthe enemy line that had been thinned, which was usually the part of theline closest to the attacked flank. The Russians and Austrians lost some 42, men, over half of their army. Almost all of the basic methods resorted to inthis proliferation were already understood and employed in Napoleonicwarfare by 1815. This meantNapoleon could always move faster than his enemies. They could be trusted to disperse, forage,and return to their regiments. Napoleon, an artillerist and a masterof combined arms, also used sequenced attacks by different arms to break aline. Within a month, the Austrian army in Bavariasurrendered the fortress of Ulm, and the allied forces were retreating outof Italy. Reference Perrett, Bryan: The Battle Book; London: Arms and Armour Press; 1993. By early autumn, Austrian troopsadvanced into Bavaria and northern Italy while a Russian army beganmarching west. Unfortunately for Napoleon, three months previousto Austerlitz the Royal Navy had won the Battle of Trafalgar: the victoryof Austerlitz would die on the fields of Waterloo as a direct consequence.Strategically, the Battle of Austerlitz only extended Napoleon's career; itdid not confirm his rule. All this changed rapidlybetween 1789 and 18 4. Napoleon turned to deal with the advancingRussians. Some of the features of modern warfarewere already present in Frederick the Great's day: standing professionalarmies, an educated officer corps, modern ranks, and standardizedregimental formations funded by the bureaucratic state. Napoleon reacted with unexpected speed, transferring the bulk of hisforces south to meet the Austrian advance. Thebattle left Napoleon virtual master of the European continent. In the heat of battle Napol?on=s plan worked perfectly. Use ofcombined arms in this aggressive way, using closely sequenced attacks, wasnew on the Napoleonic battlefield, and prior to 1813, only Napoleon'sarmies could execute such attacks. By 1815 many otherorganizational features had been developed for western European armies thatmade them essentially similar in function andconcept to armies today. New standard formationsemerged above the regiment: brigade, division, corps, army. Democracy was theultimate force multiplier. Dynastic troops were generally not allowedto disperse and forage because often they did not return. In the strategic approach, the operational approach, the engagement,and even in logistics, Napoleon's officers developed dynamic new methodsthat took advantage of the opportunities offered by the amazing new forcethat was at their disposal, new methods that gave them a decisive advantageover their adversaries. Citizens wereeligible for all ranks in careers open to talent. 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